The Changing World Order: the impact on global international relations and international security, as a consequence of war between Ukraine and Russia.

Summary

The outbreak of war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022, with Russia has created several tipping points in international relations, but not enough to cause an uprising in Russia in reaction to President Putin’s imperialist stance in his foreign policy towards neighbouring states and former Soviet countries. It has however, created several moments of forced consequence for countries in the European Union and the Region, and those members of the Security Framework embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty and its institution NATO; causing them to bring forward military plans sufficient to warrant concerns about future war in Europe, if Russia cannot be contained. This has caused realignment of nations, with Sweden applying to join NATO and Finland having received approval of membership on 4 April 2023.

This realignment of neutrality to active opposition of Russia, by other previously none aligned nations, created by geopolitics and heightened security issues caused by war in Ukraine, but also fluctuating geopolitical tensions caused by Russian policy across Europe, towards allies of NATO, such as the USA; has created a more defined shift in global World Order. One which is still emerging as multi-polar, whilst obviously refraining from a complete bipolarity in foreign policy in the region, such as that seen during the Cold War, and not disassociated at times from the old narrative of ‘East’ and ‘West’ conflict, which has not gone away.

Introduction

There is a European alignment of nations in opposition to Russia, with varying degrees of concern about spillover of war into other territories, and access to gas across Europe, which has been largely dependent on Russia for its imports. Food security for Ukraine is a significant problem, but more so the need for humanitarian relief and aid. It is also a global problem where countries such as, Pakistan, Rwanda and North Korea are dependent on Ukrainian wheat exports to fill food baskets, and also some Eastern European countries, may find that they are not likely now to easily receive Ukrainian grain without negotiation.

There are various possible outcomes and scenarios for the future of Ukraine. Security studies frameworks provide a range of possible analytical perspectives, and for those interested in the military outcomes between Russia and Ukraine (when the war is over); today’s defence strategy and military policy, resourcing, and a single territorial resolution for Ukraine. It is worth exploring those frameworks. High Level Diplomacy must therefore also reflect the ongoing conflict and the newly agreed geopolitical alignment with Ukraine and NATO allies. States are preparing for a range of possible outcomes in a changing world order, with consideration of future international legal commitments regarding Russia. This is now the case despite early degrees of difference of perspectives on continuing sanctions and foreign policy towards Russia.

[Ahead of writing this paper, I have used academic journals, related academic books on International Security and International relations theory, handwritten notes from videos, defence think-tanks, podcasts and Government Publications and BBC Documentaries. This paper contains notes on academic journals and books, media updates from international organisations. Maps and analysis on the war by journalists reveal a mix of traditional and untraditional warfare, use of modern technology like drones to collect information and intelligence].

What can we learn from IR Theory?

International relations encompass many areas of academic studies including international relations theory, international law, international development, the role of international organisations, diplomacy, and international security. Certain theories in IR align with schools of thinking, such as the English School and liberalism. Realism and neorealism, bipolarity, and the Cold War, and so on. It can be useful to group IR theory and history of events with modern international relations theory chronologically to better understand how and what has shaped and influenced ideas. Experience of events shape human thought within the state or ‘polis’, but international relations is a subject outside of the state’s immediate identity, daily politics and needs, but it is shaped by foreign policy determined by the Government of a nation. Essential for trade, treaty making, keeping peace, soft diplomacy and waging war, International Relations defines the modern state. Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Grotius, and Kant (to name but a few), provide us with the roots of international relations theory, almost like a Canon of Political Theory of the state in IR. This is the view of Chris Brown (my former IR tutor at Southampton University), Terry Nardin and Nicholas Rengger, and it is sensible, as they suggest that students approach them in a similar way as Political Theory studies.[1] However, they do neglect Carl Von Clausewitz ‘On War’ (1832) and barely touch on Machiavelli on the ‘Art of War’ (1521) [2], in fact almost any area of theory that deals with cases or historical examples of armed conflict after the Middle Ages has been excluded, possibly on purpose as classically international security is but a modern conception of external activity, and this work is about aligning IR theory with Political theory, and peaceful government, law, and diplomacy, and peace treaty. In reality and in its crudest sense a large proportion of state activity involves resourcing, recruiting and evolving technology adequate to reinforce an army for the purpose of defending a state, or for the purpose of deterrence from invasion. To be fair Chris Brown et al do not exclude war from IR theory, they have explained the nature of war, by referring to Grotius and natural law.

Samuel Pufendorf (1662) on “the law of nature and of these nations”, writes on the distinction between states and a system of state and therefore the emergence of international law (advocating a system of peace).[3] Pufendorf is interesting in what he considers the morality of waging war, and in defending ourselves the possibility of the loss of our own humanity. He also discussed the kinds of war that take place, and either defensive wars or offensive, declare or undeclared. “One may wage war on another’s behalf as well as for oneself. This is justified where the party for whom one is going to war has a just cause, and where the party coming to aid has a reasonable ground for conducting hostilities on his behalf against a third party”.[4] Civilized nations will condemn the use of poison in war or corruption, these notions remain real today within international humanitarian law. So can be found the idea in Samuel Pufendor about the role of those undertaking peace-making and the assurance of compliance on aid to those injured by the ‘other’, during those times that peace has been broken. (These are large Canons of work, but here our focus is on the conduct of war alone). Why is IR and Political theory at all useful? In response these are the building blocs of conceptions of the evolving modern state and how different theories relate with one another including international law.

Any combination of ideas or theory can produce a school of rational thinking about a problem in IR theory and potentially how to resolve a problem between states. These theories can become analytical frameworks from which to understand a moment in international relations, a war, a treaty. Political history provides the context and military strategy the idea for action in a war; within a realist framework and expectations about how states behave in an international community when under threat. International Relations theory also contains political theory and links to early ideas about the state. These early ideas are diverse in origin and from which Christian, Islamic, liberal, democratic, and republican notions of a state with degrees of divergence and differing values clamour for space and identity within the state, and all states differ. There is therefore a vast variety of diversity of thinking in International Relations theory about how to analyse a problem. We can model frameworks from analysis of international relations which can help policy makers produce ideas on scenarios and therefore options within existing or necessary future IR structures. This is within degrees of difference of opinions about what the International Community can tolerate and to what extent there is structure and an identifiable order in the world. There are discreet moment where a highly ordered world in IR exists, World War I and II for instance, but the Napoleonic Wars less so, and Roman wars are viewed as more anarchic. Highly structured IR systems tend to be modern ones, in which modern wars are fought. Classically IR theory is time centric bound by the limitations of events and context. Critical theory, such as that of Robert Cox, enables us to consider how IR theory is used. Theories are always for ‘someone and for some purpose’ and so we must consider the motivations of actors.[5]

Look at how analysis is framed and ask why? However, this cannot exclude problem solving theories, which try to fix the institutional problem or moment at hand, and are regarded at times as conservative theories, but are highly useful. Critical Theory warns us of labouring the theorist too much at the top of the chain in IR expertise and asks us to think about its structural construction, a problem-solving approach might lend itself to resolving an issue more easily than with a critical approach which is useful if you wish to change the status quo. This also seems to be an argument found in work by Chris Brown (my tutor at Southampton University) and more recently, by Matt Davies on: IR Theory: Problem Solving vs Critical Theory? (2014).[6] Problem solving theory certainly has application in resolving problems more quickly in a crisis, without changing the whole context in which the problem must be resolved first – it is much easier, this is why game theory based in problem solving approaches, has wide and more successful application for analysts studying security issues. Critical theory is like Marxist theory and resolves to answer certain questions about the world which has no or little significance to those realists trying to resolve the issues of war in UK at NATO or the EU and with its allies. This is certainly the case when the security dilemma is identified, and decisions made about how to proceed in thought and action and words. There is an agreed difference in the two approaches. There are few theorists who attempt to embrace both approaches at the same time, except for John Mearsheimer and his work on Ukraine in 2014 is controversial as it highlights the problem, that he believes the situation in Ukraine was somehow caused by Western powers causing power tensions in the Region, which had been avoided until now by respecting former Soviet Union territory.[7] He had little empathy for the West, this contrast the view liberal democracy is a given right to those that seek it and largely the strategic problem is resolved through democratic expansion across the whole of Eastern Europe or where it is welcome most, therefore the Ukraine seeking NATO membership in 2023 is an extension of a desire not to be invaded, to remain sovereign and democratic where possible. A problem-solving resolution to the present crisis could be easily accomplished through NATO membership for Ukraine today. But for those long in the game of defence and resourcing and professional war in the armed forces, this cannot be easily accomplished without meeting certain criteria, and we are not yet there. Therefore, a too simplistic approach to problem-solving will not yield results. Experience and time are essential, in building the bigger picture that the World Order needs to make room for Finland, possibly Sweden and Georgia to join NATO first in a strategically orchestrated way, to ensure world security, where present members are most vulnerable, this must be done before more countries can join, whilst providing Ukraine with the most significant support that it can in the meantime.

A conservative approach is therefore important in maintaining and supporting the structure which will serve Ukraine’s best interests, which is about maintaining the current social order in international relations and its institutions. Aside from the war there has also been a conversation about the divergence between East and Western politics, a rolling back from being a close friend to Russia. It is to theorists of IR that we look to, in order to understand the polarity between East and West in international relations – Russian Imperialism and post-Soviet Union. Cold war polarity is used to explain the widening schism in Europe. If all IR began with Aristotle, Plato and Thucydides why do we live in such schism from one another across European nations? This is a good question and deserves a long response which IR historians have tried to answer. But evolution and growing and changing populations make some ideas and theories more popular than others, so can religion or secularism impact the identity of a state. The East-West definitions are as a result of a schism which began about 1010, with the divergence of identity between Christian Orthodox churches, and later, because of competition between Empires across the globe, conceptions of ethnonationalism shaped some of the global politics, state boundaries, wars, and genocides in the Region of Europe, and where it is described loosely as Eastern Europe[8]. Empires provide the context in which states either traded, competed, or fought one another, providing resources and armed forces to fight for them. However, it is the modern state that must be analysed to understand the current situation in the Ukraine-Russian war since February 2022.

There has certainly been some discussion that IR Theory may have run through it’s uses and has died, leaving the reality of problem solving a bare necessity of tensions and conflict. But IR theory is the building bloc to resolving problems through its language and long history. It provides the necessary range of content. Critical Theory must be used in analysing Russia itself and more importantly since 2002. It is through this lens that we better understand its history and President Putin’s pursuit of the imperialist notion. There is still some good to be found in the application of Critical Theory to countries with such different experiences, that of Soviet Communism, or else we risk leaving eastern nations isolated – Ukraine has far to go. Matt Davies has done some good work in looking at the Chris Brown differentiations in IR theory, and also argues a case to keep Critical Theory as a useful tool for exposing structural problems and corruption. “As Ranciere suggests, it disrupts the order of the “distribution of the sensible.” Critical theory works by making visible the relationships and the things that International Relations refuses to recognise and qualify as relationships or things. It makes audible the voices of people not qualified to speak in International Relations. Against the technocratic barriers to international living and understandings, critical theory identifies the arbitrariness and artificiality of barriers and explains them in relation to their roles in the division of labour, social reproduction, or system maintenance”[9]. Critical International Theory therefore supports those seeking emancipation from a system which does not help to meet their needs or goals. It makes room for global conversations and engagement which facilitates civil society to speak for itself [10]– Ukraine has a voice which must be and is being heard amongst an international community of states. It is a useful theory in that is a mix or constellations of theories that we trust and can apply to IR problems.[11]

Deepshikha Shahi (2017) describes this phenomenon in the following ways “The dominant social strata fuse together to compose the hegemonic historic bloc (intellectual and moral bloc). The social practices and the ideologies that legitimise the hegemonic historic bloc constitute the formation of a hegemonic order.”[12] In the case of war between Ukraine and Russia, the international community have responded to Ukraine’s actions and words within a hegemonic bloc of nations from within the European Union and NATO agree to support, resource and to seek a strategy for the Eastern flank alongside Ukraine, facing Russia head on. The Northen Flank Norway, Finland and Sweden are regrouping to join this hegemonic bloc of ideology, for the purpose of defending itself politically and as a deterrence to any possible future invasion. We are witnessing a shift in World Order. These nations however are not declaring or waging war on Russia, these words are about structural change in International Relations. Globalisation changed the world and there is a sense of shared understanding about behaviours, values, and expectations about how to behave in international relations. It means that interactions amongst civil societies are global and interconnected, there is little that can exist in the long term in isolation. Where globalisation fails to resolve issues for humankind, we revert to theories and world structure which fit with our needs and values at that time. The EU is an evolving structure of centuries old relationships and agreements between European states which have largely settled for peace amongst each other – they share a reason to exist. A mix or a mishmash of structures – is applied where there is little agreement amongst larger powers, yet within that arrangement there are high degrees of continuous global politics – Brexit has proven that we need other states, differently – but that isolationism is impossible for our survival economically. But there may be a time when Britain will want to and will actively seek to be part of a superstructure again in the future.

Critical International Theory is limited in understanding the War in Ukraine.

All IR theory has a limit when analysing war, as by this stage waring nations are unlikely to agree with one another. It is safer to fall back on realist approach once on the theatre of war. Security Studies is largely found within a different school of thinking that assumes states, are in conflict or have the potential for conflict. This analytical school of thought includes the idea that there are different histories about waring nations. It is not a mishmash of option, but a set of discreet theories about states and state behaviour in war. The Royal Services Institute (RUSI) in 2022 provided a serious discussion about the evolution of the Western Way of War, in contrast to Eastern European contexts[13]. Political history and military history underpin inexhaustible evidence of Western Warfare – the differences and differing values and histories, rooted in the East are set out by Eurasian, Russian and Eastern European scholars, and their evolving scholarship throughout the recent decades. IR Theory is too limiting to understand in full the detail of battles in the field of war, and so what is dominating in the Region – soo using a subsection of IR scholarship, such as Security Studies and possibly diplomacy, enable us to better understand some of the issues; accepting modern warfare contains technology which were not available in 1985, the conversation must involve some understanding of developing technology in 2023 – of AI, cyber threats and military hardware, such as the dangers of cluster missiles, and the tactical use of anti-tanks weapons and drones in the field, are the daily realities of warfare.

Another important dimension to consider is that of law in international relations and in the conduct of war. Chris Brown, Terry Nardin and Nicholas Rengger do not discuss international law in the conduct of war, but do frame that law is an important part of international relations in political thought. To this he adds Grotius, in distinguishing the natural law and rights, in the context of the respect of property and the rights of other people, have and hold property – for the purpose of ‘self-preservation’.[14] “Grotius developed the implications of his theory of natural rights for international relations in The Law of War and Peace (1625) it is concerned with both private and public law, understood as a distinct body of law regulating [IR]”.[15] It signals a body of law applicable to a community. Like individuals it is assumed that states also have rights to protect themselves. The law evolving at this stage in IR is not sophisticated enough to deal with modern warfare, however, it does provide enough rational thought about why states may ‘justly’ go to war with one another within a community of states living with one another. There cannot be a ‘moral life without some greater authority to declare and enforce common law’. Here morality is largely defined by Christian ethics.[16] It is around this time that the laws about and governing individuals begin to be extended to states, Thomas Hobbes also developed the laws of nature further, but he is not the foundation of IR Law. States can wage war to defend themselves, morally this is acceptable, but it is less so when waging war on another state without cause.

Just war theory is rooted in a Western tradition of thinking about war from the Middle Ages, a primary influence is the work of St Augustine of Hippo and St Thomas Aquinas. Here I will refer to St Aquinas further and the work of Richard Miller (2002), as it is from St Aquinas’ questions on war, Q40 and his subsequent responses that we learn about his rational thought on the subject and concur that there is room for just war and evangelical pacifism as described by Gregory Reichberg (2002).[17] However, the two read the texts differently, but raise moral questions that enables us to perceive the wide range of views and thoughts and interpretations of just war theory. Reichberg is not wrong to say that St Aquinas was not a pacifist only in as much that he did not develop a complete dialectic around pacifism, that has happened much later on reflection by theologians who separate man’s world like St Augustine of Hippo; but others may disagree in the length of time it took Christian theologians to develop a complete case for peace and pacifism in theological terms.

St Aquinas is involved in the practical world of realism and the Roman City State at war and the Christian state at war, in which he argues that war is less protracted in a Christian state. Both he and St Aquinas are responsible for just war rationality.[18] St Aquinas did however begin to lay the ground for a view of just war within ethics in Summa Theologiae II-III. Just war theory in all its interpretations is founded on natural justice and certain presumptions against killing and war. Richard Miller for example develops this idea to mean “when nations enter war they risk the well-being of their citizens along with that of other members of the human and non-human life insofar as it poses risks to cultural resources, economic, political and domestic arrangements, and the natural environment. Those fact do not necessarily make a war unjust but suggest caution when political leaders consider any military force in response to aggression”.[19] Reichberg may argue that Miller is more of a pacifist for developing this position.[20] I do agree with Miller that Just War theory asks us to evaluate the reasons and costs of war, and involves political reasoning, that citizens are morally obliged not to accept unjust policies and to seek a sense of justice enforced in political and social life. However, there are degrees of involvement, and many people may choose not to engage with the idea beyond immediate necessity. This is also a choice but is challenged by Christian ethics on the obligation of fighting tyranny and corruption, which is established from the Middle Ages. There is a language and logic from which just war theory has developed and become written into international law. [21]

Just war theory is qualified by considerations of charity, St Aquinas responds in Obj 3, “that there is a natural law, the natural law of reason, dictates the things that, the law of nations, for instance that a neighbour be treated equitably”.[22]

Just War theory can help us understand how to build a framework to analyse a particular war:

Is conflict a just war? (What is being fought for?) Is this a defensive, offensive war or a preventative strike? What long-term impact does this action have on neighbouring states and the relationship between the aggressor and the defending state? How will that be managed?
What are the cost and benefit of conducting a war in accordance with just war? Resources, and impact on environment and civilians and neighbouring states.
Does it conform with international law? With regards to treatment of refugees, children, women and civilians, and armed military armed forces.
Is there a case for reconstruction? Who should pay?
Is the action proportionate, and just in the case of every miliary action?

Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Marcus Aurelius, Richelieu, Cicero, St Augustine, St Aquinas all provide some discussion about the tension between ethics, just war rationality, the need for restraint in conducting wars without proper and considered regard for the above, whilst at the same time finding war abhorrent. Wars can however be prompted by the need to conduct humanitarian intervention such as in the case of Kosovo (1998-99) to prevent continued genocide. It has been used to examine the purpose of the many crusades and various wars and up to the 16^th century there was reference to international laws ‘jus gentium’ or law of nations, in support of those suffering from tyranny and maltreatment. This is applied to inter-state wars and cannot be conducted by private individuals, but by those who have authority to raise an army (a monarch or elected individual). Until 1918 waging war was an attribute of the sovereign state and was actively pursued and promoted as a quality of statehood.[23]

The tensions within just war theory arise regularly resolved in a ‘middle road’, “between the application of a real politik approach, with regards to the just use of force and how, and in what circumstances, described as the moral dilemmas of war are irrelevant in [real] international politics, and the alternative world view of pacifism”.[24] “According to this middle road, war is deplorable but under certain circumstances justified and necessary as a last resort”.[25] The analytical framework in legal terms has always been based on the following, jus ad bellum (right to go to war) and jus in bello (right to conduct war), there is a third area which is developing just post bellum (the morality of post-war settlement and reconstruction). The fundamental principle of just war theory is one of restraint, conducted with moral justification and empowerment.

Application of restraint – for policy makers, military leaders, lawyers, and academics

However, there is a warning applied to the theory in that war can lead to unrestrained war, or a maxim or an absolute war which is undesirable. Anthony Coates (2003) in particularly well argued in his statement that “without restraint war cannot be justified and yet it seems the more war is justified the less restrained it becomes. As a realist have frequently observed, that attempt to justify war to moral regulation leads all to easily to its escalation rather than its limitations”.[26] This is the problem with real politk, peace building negotiators would argue. Whilst realist would argue that this is the problem with restraint, that it isn’t practicable, as the concept of limiting war is unstable (but morality may be at odds with the issue) as policy goals may not remain limited, and solutions require more flexibility.

Within international security studies, just war serves a discrete purpose, but its moral deliberations are in the form of theory and international law, or international humanitarian law which is intended to make war more humane. It discretely sets aside objections from pacifists and opens the legal and dialectical problems of how to conduct a just war. It encapsulates the Western tradition of realism, liberalism, the concept of uncertainty, security dilemmas, game theory, human security, alliances, and the role of regional institutions. These are the key theories and topics which those who have accepted the trappings of just war theory in international security engage with daily.

The moral case for war

In Anthony Coates we find evidence that both Christian Saints were willing to defend the moral instrumentality of war, there are positive and negative ways of arguing just wars. It is not to idealise war, there are moral and physical costs in war. Analysts look at the Gulf War (1990-91) as an example, Iraq (2003-2011), Afghanistan (2001-2021) and Syria (2011), in each case what is required is a just recourse where there is a role for moral endorsement. “The danger of concentrating on the distinction between just and unjust wars is that it may deflect moral attention away from those wars that have been identified as ‘just’ with the result that the application of the idea of just war comes to have an empowering rather than restraining effect”. [27] ‘Defensive’ wars can be conceived and fought positively as just as ‘offensive’ wars (armed humanitarian intervention for example), can be conceived, and fought negatively”. [28] Containing war through morality is one way of dealing with the moral dimensions of waging war, this is based on the assumption of those who are readily convinced by their moral and historical justification of war, and have the ability and resourcefulness to conduct war, that they can contain the developing situation. Coates is clear about additional dimension of the moral case for war when considering these conflicts; that “there is no lust for war to compare with the moral lust for war”.[29] Here he warns of terrorists attempting to use just war theory, but they fall at the first hurdle as they already are deemed private individual seeking revenge with the authority invested in an elected body and lacks authenticity.

To this dimension we can add the following dilemma of just war theory and Coates warns us of the dangers of its misuse in that it “used to quell moral doubts about war, to silence or forestall moral criticism, to marshal support or to clear a path for war…Thereby, an instrument of moral criticism is in danger of being transformed into a tool of political propaganda”.[30] This would support the case of pacifists or at best provides the critical view to bring down government policy which is unwelcome by a population, the social elite, academics and lawyers and Parliamentarians in rejection of a Government or its policies. In some cases, populations facing absolute war such as World War I and II had no way of rejecting the policy decisions which were made for them. Propaganda in the case of World War II was essential in maintaining the war effort and there were few people who could argue that fighting fascism in Europe was a poor moral cause. Propaganda became a necessary and useful tool for fighting a war at home as well as abroad – it was a war about our ultimate survival. These wars may fulfil the criteria of an ‘authentic war’, which Coates alludes to. A check list approach, although crude can help us better understand that war has always terrible outcomes in its fatalities and violence.

The Framework for Analysis: War in Ukraine

The assumptions is that within the security studies the application of realist theory (to include classical and neoclassical realism), involves the ideas and the influence and the work of discrete theorist, Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, Martin Wright and Hans Morgenthau Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Waltz’s theory of international relations Theory of International Politics and John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. It is useful to look at the rise and fall of states through their prism of power-seeking states in a power maximization paradigm, that reflects the current context of China, Russia, and South Korea. The framework embraces that reality that there is a coalition of states in Europe the EU, and that their military power is identify embodied in NATO with support from Allied nations. They identify as Liberal and democratic (defined in theory). There is an acknowledgment of a divergence even amongst these groups, due to history, boundaries, and degrees of ‘closeness’ (in acceptance of some influence or financial support) to Russia and geopolitics and reliance in recent decades on economic support and commodities, such as gas.

There is however both a global conception of the problems faced by Eastern Europe which do not fit with conceptions of former Soviet states as Russian, in fact history shows that the Ukraine was a diverse nation of various multinational and ethnic group which challenged the conception of Ukraine as ‘Little Russia’, which it wishes to shake off permanently. The historic schism between East and West, described by historians and IR scholars, exists. Continuing evolution of difference from Western Europe can be found in the competition for territory and resources by Imperial Russia to Stalin’s Soviet Empire. There is also an older history of Impirical cycles in Eastern Europe, which describes competition towards the rest of Europe. There is also a Western way of war rooted in history, found in early Greek and Roman history, in active warfare throughout European military history, strategy, and kinetic military activity. The application of international law is expected to prevail, and today include the international humanitarian law that cover the demands of modern warfare and the rights of personnel in the field and the protection of civilians. Critical theory provides a useful framework from which to examine arguments raising several questions.

What are the possible range of scenario arising from the present conflict (applying some game theory) to events in Ukraine?
What are the possible range of military events arising from the war between Russia and Ukraine on Ukrainian territory?
What are the options for NATO membership and why?
What global issues arise and is there evidence of spillover to Kosovo and neighbouring vulnerable countries?
What is the real or perceived threat that could make Russia use nuclear weapons?

IR theory is one of realism. It is important to look at the case of Russia-Ukraine conflicts through critical lenses. It is important to note that Marxist theory supported destroying support for the Imperial Russian state – but Russification of neighbouring states existed prior to this, the Soviet Empire was also an empire, its fall facilitated the democratisation of many former soviet states. Stalin’s conception of a modern Russia continues today, but adapted by Russian elites to ensure centralised power. There remains some problem with the concept that there is a need to protect former Soviet states from democracy or advancing Westernisation in terms of values and territory.

The neighbouring states are vulnerable to hybrid warfare used by Russia in the Caucuses’ such as Georgia and Ukraine, cyber-attacks, meddling in domestic affairs weaponization of energy resources, economic leverage, and corruption. Russia’s responses have changed in that Russia is providing asymmetric responses to Western mobilisation. Since 2008 it has used a massive cyber campaign attacking TV outlets and banks in Georgia, disrupting computer servers which have become increasingly sophisticated and there is increasing evidence that they have used economic pressure and air bans to gain ground against Georgia, which is seeking to join NATO. It has used a mixture of media narratives, leading a well-planned misinformation campaign in Georgia, creating damaging narrative against significant people.[31] Accusations are that the USA is using Georgia as a weapon against Russia is an example of damaging narratives, intended to demonise the West. So how to approach the analysis on realignments in World Order in Eastern Europe, when there are conflicting messages about events in countries which are former Soviet nations?

Security Studies (a subsection of IR and which links with certain IR theories and military studies), can provide a clearer understanding of what is taking place in the region. Application of security theory in the uncertainty of war in Ukraine in relation to NATO and the EU and its wider allies, should consider the following security dilemma in relation to the moments which took place on 24 February 2023 and the escalating action on both sides and the war’s evolution since then.

This framework can apply the following security dilemma in relation to war in Ukraine and wider response from NATO allies. The Security Dilemma as described by Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler in Security Studies (2008;2013) is the most, appropriate one in this case and has general application for every war. It is one generally accepted in Security Studies and provides an analysis of the dilemma of going to war, within a recognisable moral framework. The box below is a direct copy from a common Security Studies handbook for University Students, both theorists are highly regarded in IR scholarship.

The analytical framework is based on a number of key points and security tools.

First the above security dilemma applies to the Ukraine war, Ukraine is defending its sovereign territory which has been invaded since 24 February 2022, and this has tipped into an escalation of aggression shown towards Ukraine by Russia since 2014 and the annexation of its territory, Crimea. The Ukrainian Executive has responded to the security issues arising – President Zelensky has provided clear public statements about their intention in Ukraine’s actions in defending its territory from Russian aggression and occupation. Its tactics are its own since 2022, it has pushed back against Russian forces which had gained considerable ground and several cities, forcing Russia out of many occupied towns Ukraine has led an offensive since end of May/June to move Russia out of its occupied territory including Crimea which has been annexed in 2014.

Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler state, that the “Security dilemma sensibility is an actor’s intention and capability to perceive the motives behind and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the military intention of others. In particular, it refers to the ability to understand the role that fear might play in their attitudes and behaviour, including crucially, the role that one’s own actions may play in provoking that fear.” This perspective has been key in Ukrainian attitude and military tactics towards the war.

Secondly, I would suggest that after more than a year of war that there is no security paradox in relation to the Ukraine and Russian conflict. Russia intended to cause mutual hostility and Ukraine has responded, but not in the way it expected, by rejecting Russian occupation soo forcefully. Internationally, the military lines have been drawn clearly with a ‘Northern flank’ in Northern Europe; Sweden, Finland, and Norway and an ‘Eastern Flank’, Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and Estonia. These countries have NATO membership or allegiances, [with Germany providing military bases from which further action could be taken]. With the UK, France and Italy providing military resources through NATO in support of the Ukrainian military strategy.

Thirdly, it is clear to Ukraine that Russia denies its existence by the narrative from Russia about Ukrainian existence without Russian influence as an impossibility, a denial of its individual identity. Russia’s intention was to destabilise and occupy Ukraine and it had expected to encircle key cities at the start of the war and to occupy them. This has not happened and the ground that they took in March 2022 has been regained by Ukrainian forces in 2023. There is to Russia a question about Ukrainian identity which is disputed, which has been transferred to its territorial integrity. The International Community is not evenly split about Russia, but the West has drawn key lines on the map along with its allies on the issue of Ukrainian State Sovereignty.

Fourth. This framework challenges the conception that psychology of actors does not have an impact on outcomes, at the very least you must understand the psychology of the aggressor, as the outcome of escalating war possess a significant problem for many states. Small and large events are affected by the reaction to events or the psychology behind them, which provides the motivation or intention behind an aggressor’s actions. President Zelensky is very aware of the limitations of Ukraine in relation to Russian military forces and has understood Russian military intentions, using tactical manoeuvres and exploiting Russian strategic vulnerabilities in relation to the Russian army, its use of young Russian conscripts, capturing soldiers, using missiles and weapons tactfully rather than in large quantities and making use of intelligence and surveillance techniques (the use of drones). The Psychology of President Putin, his Oligarchy and the Russian political elite are important in understanding Russian strategy and tactics in the war. There is a problem in international security to be resolved.

Fifth. History has a part in understanding the context of the war. There is a Russian classical or pre-industrialisation pre-1918 Russian History, which describes its Imperial traditions from before the 18^th century, present in written military history, literature, arts, institutions, and politics. There is a Western interpretation of Classical Russian culture and politics, which can be studied and appreciated. Post 1918 -Soviet history should be read in isolation as a unique moment in Russian existence, one which changed the order of Russian society completely; social orders and structures and institutions soo dramatically that it bares no resemblance to the past. Soviet history provides the backdrop of modern understanding of Russian-Ukraine relations. Analysis of Ukraine in the 1930’s gives us a window into its identity at the time and how social culture was structured which was sustained until 1989. Barry Buzan (2008;2013) also contributes and interesting conversation about polarity during and after the Cold War in IR. This along with Game Theory provide a backdrop for understanding the security dilemma in which the West finds itself in relation to the War between Ukraine and Russia. The International history leading to events is also useful, in analysing whether we have gone full circle through periods of Russian Imperialism and aggression towards its neighbours and its policy towards the ‘West’ and sets of nations in relation to its own policy agenda.

Ukraine and Russian Imperialism: A History of continuous intervention and religious identity

Starting with the fifth point – history. There is a tradition in Russian studies of reflection on Russian history to provide background to concepts of Russian nationalism. The concept of Imperialism inspires nationalism and expansion, which has taken place in what Richard Wartman describes through what can be defined as cyclical periods throughout history, throughout the 16^th, 17^th, and 18^th Centuries. Often inspired until 1917 by Monarchs and the Orthodox Churches, these imperialist events are evident in both the East and West where Louis the XIV is defined as an absolutist in France (1638-1715).[32] Peter the Great (1672-1725) an autocrat and a reformer, who having been apprenticed as an artillery engineer, travelled in Western Europe, reformed the court with western influences and the Russian army along western military thinking. He pioneered education, particularly in schooling of maths and navigation. In 1654, part of now modern Ukraine came under the rule of Russia which offered military protection to a large area in the Northeast of the country, which had been agreed under Treaty of Pereylslave, which had been under the rule of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Two other treaties followed one in 1667 and 1687, The last known as the Eternal Peace, it established the Cossack Hetmante – as Zaporizhian Host, a largely Cossack state in Southern Ukraine, and was identified as such by the Ottoman Empire. It remained under Russian rule, with autonomy from 1721, under the Tsar or Emperor. Sometimes referred as to as ‘Little Russia’, it is thought that it derived from the term called ‘Little Rus’, to refer to Ukraine as early as 1335. By the 18^th Century the area was known as Novorossiya (New Russia). Within Soviet History it is the Cossack Hetmante which is considered the corner stone of Soviet Ukraine. Students of this period are most aware of the tension between Russian and Ukrainian identity, arising from the history of occupations, of Ukrainian land territory by Russian forces. This is the IR history of the region, but the term ‘Little Russia’ was use by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, who was the See of Constantinople of Hesycham[33], who held control over various Orthodox Church jurisdiction. There was a difference of opinion amongst the Latins (Western Christianity) and those who followed the Palamite doctrines; those who disagreed would immigrate and join the Western Churches. Palamitism is one of many theological concepts which divide the Churches, and which began to be discussed in the 14^th Century and became dogma in 1351.

The most notable disagreements being at the Councils of Constantinople. Although this paper is not about theology, there is no doubt that conversations amongst the established elite at the time, which included the Church, reflected also possibly be coincidence, the differences between East and West, which became cultural divides, stemming from faith practise over hundreds of years. The concept is linked to contemplative prayer which became dogma in the Eastern Orthodox Churches only and is linked in Hesychasm. The Hesychast Synods were held in Constantinople in 1341.

The conversation about ‘East and West’ distinctions continued and were presided over by Emperor Andronkikos III in 1341 – East and West have never reconciled. Although attempts have been made to bring the Eastern Orthodox Churches together with Western Christianity, on the surface the differences appear to be largely historical and cultural, and which can and have become political in 2016-23. In reality there, have been fundamental belief differences, which have caused tensions between the Churches since this time. Geopolitics, I would argue also must have played a part in the schism, as such wide-ranging cultural practises of a single religion should be expected given the expanse of the Empire of Christian Latins speaking people, across continents, it is difficult to manage all the Churches under a single dogma for hundreds of years. However, it is the political role that the Eastern Orthodox Church can take, supported by Russia in more recent years, that has isolated the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, and which can feel the influence of Russian Orthodoxy within Ukraine. The Churches have since gone their separate ways, but the issue has been an important one since the war began, causing issues around loyalty to Russian and Ukraine and some dogma, and raising cultural identity issues, which the Ukrainian Government has wished to resolve permanently, by distancing itself from quasi political figures like Patriach Krill who is loyal politically to President Putin and is supported by Russia. Ukraine has also moved since 2014, further away from Russian influence in all areas preferring a permanent democratic voice without Russian interference or influence. Tensions have always existed between the Latins now Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodox beliefs.

This history is also intertwined with Imperialism, under the Tsars the Eastern Churches seemed to perform a state function, in marriages and baptism. Controversially some Russian Monarchs continued to pursue Western Enlightenment and reform, even under Catherine the Great (1796-1796) who was a fervent reformer and caused a fall out with Orthodox practise due to her loyalties to alternative religious ideas, (and overthrew her husband Peter III). Alexander I (1777-1825) in 1805 joined Britain against the Third War of the Coalition against, Napolean, pursing ideas of enlightenment Government. Nationalism was as Wartman suggests a contested subject amongst elites in Russia and the Monarchy, who in the 1860’s decided to emancipate the Court under the Zemstove reforms, promoted by Russian Government officials, the emancipation of the Court intwined with the idea of protecting the ‘fatherland’.[34] Unfortunately, Alexander II limited participation of the people alienating educated society and created what Richard Wartman describes as “inconsistent revolutionary movement”.[35] “The result was a wedge driven between the autocrat and those who believed that only representative institutions could express the needs of a Russian nation”.[36] The Russian Monarchy embodied the Russian nation leaving little room for a Russian people. Alexander’s II approach was to introduce a nationalism evoking religious and ethnic ideals about Russian people, bringing the Monarch and State more closely together. The emancipation of serfs in 1861 had made a huge change to people’s lives in all parts of society and Alexander II continued. In 1888 the new Tsar Alexander III travelled through Ukraine, promoting a concept of Russian land, and an ethnic Russia, defined as a ‘new national character’, almost subjugating other national identities, raising Russia to an imperial nation. Discussion about a single Russian state increased, imperial ideas had included other nationalities belonging to a tsarist state embodied in a ‘national spirit’, but in reality, the assembly of land manifestations of the nation were controlled by a Russian Centre.[37] They appropriated space in national identity, which occupied what was described as ‘empty land’.

Some of this is evident in Russian literary works by Dostoyevsky (about the ordinary people and their lives and the drudgery of the poor in isolated farms) and Tolstoy on his description of Imperial Russia and social class amongst the nobility who ruled Russia, promoting Imperial Russian culture and language. Ukraine retained the name ‘Little Russia’ by Alexander, throughout this period, was actively during the Crimean war, the battle of Sebastopol 1854, as an artillery officer, Ukrainian lands were continuously sought for political reasons and resourcing of the Russian Imperial purpose. This period in history is described as Russian imperialism and is used to describe President Putin’s stance towards his neighbours. It is therefore useful to understand the background of what has inspired an ideology of leadership, however ironic, Russian imperial history has context and a marked difference between the Soviet Russia to come. Idealising the past however, is dangerous as many elites of the Russian imperial houses soon found out, resulting in many leaving Russia from before the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Yet the idea of Imperialism remained within what is proudly Russian history and culture, art, literature, music and art. Wartman is a good historian for IR history as he recounts the stages of the Revolution to come in 1917. Recounting the three Dumas from 1905-1912 and the role of the Russian Prime Minister Peter Stolypin, who sought to strengthen the Monarchy by modernising the rural economy. Again, the driving force was more Imperialism driven by Tsarism, ‘a political nation of groups hoping through the state to realize nationalist imperialist goals”.[38]

So in conclusion Imperialism is part of a Russian national concept from the past, which is being used today to describe certain behaviours from its liberal elites and Leader President Putin. Frthjof Benjamin Schenk (2019) also favours this historical approach when analysing European Regions and Boundaries, The UN he claims has treated Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, the Republic of Moldova, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia as Eastern Europe and that the CIA perceives the Russian Federation as part of Central Asia, and Ukraine and Belarus as part of Europe. There is extensive historical debate about the definition of Easter Europe, in academic circles the rise of Eurasia also signified a changing political change in World Order amongst nations commonly described by Europeans as Eastern Europe, which has refocused studies within a particular period of time and events.
Placing Bohemia, Poland, and Hungary in East Central Europe and Russian and the Soviet Union under Eastern Slavic influence and religious Orthodoxy.[39] He warns of stereotyping the Czech Republic and Hungary claim to be inhabiting central not Eastern Europe.[40] And that people in Ukraine and Belarus conceive of themselves as living “not in Eastern Europe, but between Western and Eastern Europe”.[41] This is important when thinking about both countries and the recent historical changes in the Ukrainian Constitution and alignment with Western politics. There is also a distinct difference he argues in the Orient and Oriental Europe, which sought trade and influences from the Orient into Court life from before the early 19^th century.

Soviet history is very specific and has inspired a continuation of a form of Russian nationalism today, popular sovereignty through participation of institutions, a consciousness of nation developed which involved the expansion of Russian lands. Mayhill Fowler asks us to consider a Ukraine beyond Russia in work published in 2015-2016, Going Global with Culture in Ukraine. In his studies of Ukrainian ethno-national identity both the Hapsburg, Romanovs and Ottoman Empires recognised Ukraine and its culture and also under the Second Republic and Soviet Union. He describes the model of Ukraine as ‘Little Russia’ as limiting and limited. He goes on to develop a historical and comprehensive analysis of historic culture in Ukraine based on ethno-nationality, the model he builds is one in which other cultures are found living and thriving in Ukraine, which is not all Slavic, the previous model ignores Jewish people, polish people, Catholics, and Greeks. He promotes in his writings and findings a view that Ukrainian culture was richly diverse and a tool for soft diplomacy at times. In 1936 under the SSR there were Moldovan language theatres, but also German, Armenian, Bulgarian, and Yiddish. Rarely were cultural institutions theatres museums or orchestras comprised of members of a single ethnic groups. This transfer of identity may account for some Eurasian studies, where Universities in the USA group together Jewish, Russian, polish studies. Military art is used as historical documentation of events, such as that of the Crimean War.[42] Fowler does open a difficult problem with this period of Ukrainian-Russian relations, where the Soviet System allowed for mixing and diversity, it also sought to stamp out any resistance amongst the educated population. The party State executed Soviet Ukrainian artist and published letters from Stalin to show that he had no love for Ukrainian intellectuals. Later Fowler states that multi-ethnic nationalism did not fit so well with nationalism.

My conclusion is that this is common in European nationalism which influences all nations, once roused it begins to ignite with all groups only to find at its heart a desire for some unachievable purity erupting into ethnic tensions. It is a huge problem historically in Europe and has caused genocide and World Wars. The assumption now is that this can and should never happen again, but countries teeter even in the 2020’s – Spain, Italy, France, Germany even the UK with the rise of Scottish and English nationalism, and Brexit has caused some uncomfortable moments amongst multi-ethnic Britain – as Europe’s liberal global thinkers grapple with the problems – wind rush scandal, questions about policing and the use of the police amongst civil society has caused anxiety, funding for science projects and membership of Horizon has caused concern amongst the UK academic and research community, also a decline in economic growth with the fall in EU trade – this has raised some serious questions for the UK Government to manage under PM Rishi Sunak, and also some ideological political questions about British identity, which is inclusive, but is threatened by tides of nationalism.

The Problem with modern European Security

The fourth point, we now have a problem in European Security. Many IR scholars believe that the Ukraine-Russian crisis could dramatically change the way Europeans think about security.[43] The European Council on Foreign Relations carried out some data searches which identified the war in Ukraine as a form of Security issue for European Security. They would like Europe to respond to the crisis, with majority supporting a response from NATO and the EU in particular.[44] Europeans disagree on which one is the most pressing threats linked to the crisis and on the price their country should pay to defend Ukrainian people in Poland, Romania, and Sweden, are much more willing to make sacrifices than those in France and Germany. Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard go through several graphs and statistics to describe emotions, politics, and policies towards Ukraine.[45] The crisis they conclude will test European’s readiness to defend the European Security Order. The Royal Services Institute (RUSI) which is an independent evidenced based research institute on Defence in the UK publishes regular monthly report on Ukraine and confirm that there are several questions for the defence community to analyse and answer. These have included analysis on the war on resourcing of the British Army in relation to the war, the report identifies Russia as the cause and present threat.[46] The Institute have explored Ukraine’s military tactics on the seas (sea Power – and Ukraine’s raid on Sevastopol), have raised the problem that possible conflict in the Indo-Pacific, could find the USA over committed, compromising the War in Ukraine. There is a clear message from analysts that this conflict is putting at risk ‘hemispheric security’. Senior policy advisors at RUSI have stated that; “The inherently imperial motivations behind Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine and its approach to the war have significant implications for Western support to Ukraine and the prospects for a just peace”.[47]

The key findings arising from the ECFR Report and country surveys, which included Finland, Germany, Poland, Romania, and Sweden is that the war has put the question of their security on the table.

Prompting a geopolitical awakening amongst Europeans. War is no longer unthinkable,
That Europeans biggest fears related to the crisis differ from country to country,
That European. governments need to plan from various contingencies to ensure the burden on ordinary citizens is not too great. (This could involve from a policy perspective a state war economy contingency plan, expansion of certain defence services and military resourcing, and other economic considerations such as food and energy, and education, and health security planning).
The removal of neutrality from Finland and Sweden takes away the fear out of military conflict in the future. Respondents view the invasion of Ukraine to Russia as a European Crisis (unlike the invasion of 2014), 73% of respondents in Poland saw the invasion as inevitable, 64% in Romania, 55% Sweden and Germany and France 52%, and 44% in Finland (those over 60 expected conflict). [48]
Individual populations are reckoning the prospects of a Russian invasion in Poland those of 60 are most worried, Finland and Sweden consider the possibility of Russian invasion in their own countries as highly possible, and in Germany and Italy, and Finland, and Romania it is the younger post-war generation which are most concerned about Russia.[49]
Most respondents agreed that NATO is the best solution to the problem and best placed to respond, in conjunction with the EU and then followed by the USA. This is a marked change from Cold War perspectives which indicate that this conflict cannot be managed by the USA, China, and Russia, as in the past. Only Poland presented a view that the (military) conflict should be handled by the EU.
Multilateral geopolitics plays some role, Italy, Poland, Germany, Romania primary trust NATO to protect their interests (political), Finland, Sweden mostly trust the EU to do so, but only 30% of those questioned in Sweden were glad that it was not a member of NATO at the time.[50]
The conclusion was that Europe was in a pre-war state, suggesting that something should be done to prepare for conflict from 2022 statistics.
What is not clear from the report whether this could be a new Cold War with Russia, or a pre-Third World War scenario, which has not escalated. Therefore a ‘pre-war state’, is sufficient for describing the international relations context from February 2022. The report highlights that the most prevalent European country perspective is that Ukraine should be defended.
The UK leaving the EU means that it must leverage International Relations differently and elsewhere possibly, as it is no longer at the EU negotiating table as a member – “ECFR’s survey also proves that Brexit means Brexit. London’s much-publicised show of solidarity with Kyiv notwithstanding, very few citizens anywhere in Europe see much of a role for the United Kingdom. Only in Poland (66 %) and Sweden (52 %) do most respondents think that the UK should come to Ukraine’s defence.”[51]

The UK PM has been active in providing political and military equipment to the Ukraine and has provided funding to NATO and is asking members to match its commitment to the Organisation. £1.5bn has be provided to Ukraine by the UK for humanitarian and economic aid. A further £1bn has been given to Ukraine, bringing this into a total of £2.5bn in military aid, such as anti-tank equipment, and missiles, armoured vehicles, and air defence systems.[52] And Britain is committed to providing NATO with 2% of GDP in defence spending, as a ‘floor not a ceiling’ to investment in military resourcing.[53] Britain is asking other countries to make similar strong commitments. It is a key country in the conflict due to its nuclear capability, and strengthen commitment to work with allies through NATO, and its joint Ten Nation Expeditions, and Five Eyes. A £25M innovation fund is available to small defence businesses to help provide strategic and military UK innovation for the conflict.

Therefore, there is appropriate response to the conflict by Britain. Finland becoming a member of NATO on 4 April 2023, has changed the neutral status of the Northern Flank of European and has prompted geopolitics to realign militarily, with Sweden actively seek membership status. The Finish have a particularly strong reason for joining the alliance, for historical reasons as well as they had suffered from Russian invasion in 1808-09 and became annexed by Russia until 1917, when Finland was then able to declare independence from Russia, as it had weakened from internal conflict and Revolution and after civil war received full state sovereignty in 1918, joining the League of Nations, with the purpose of developing international relations with Scandinavian countries. Russia’s invasion in the 19^th century was primarily about securing Leningrad, which was situated near to the Finish border, securing more land territory, and using Finland as a strategic buffer state. Russia attempted a similar strategic move on 30 November1939 and it ended within three and a half months, the invasion was declared illegal by the League of Nations and Russia suffered terrible losses despite its military strength. Finland clearly does not wish to find itself in this position again and joining NATO strengthens its current alignment with Scandinavian nations and should also ensure better relations with countries like the UK. Sweden is now expected to follow given that the initial refusal by Turkey, has now been removed on meeting certain demands and satisfying certain defence criteria and resourcing. The Partnership for Peace Treaty which both nations belong to since 1997, provided peace in the region and assured NATO support from these nations including Austria. NATO Membership is now one step closer to a new Order in Europe, as membership implies that they are no longer under any influence of Russia, and less likely to suffer invasion. RUSI has also hosted several conversations on the developing war, the role of Northern Flank Countries and NATO, as well as analysis on hybrid warfare. Views expressed generally align with comments here. The argument that there is a reordering of nations is supported by the evidence of states becoming aligned in Europe, around a single view that Ukraine must be defended, only polarized it would seem by Russia, so for all intensive purposes this is the hegemonic view in the Region, aligned with other nations from the wider international community, Japan, Australia, Canada, USA and various Latin American, countries have voiced their support for UN Sanctions against Russia and have condemned President Putin. For a successful outcome the new alignment or Order in the World must be established and become permanent.

Thiery Tardy (20220) in Ukraine, NATO and the Madrid Strategic Concept, War in Europe: Preliminary lessons, goes one step further and asserts that a war, on between alliances and Russia is now no longer unlikely. And this is the ‘unintended spillover of the Ukraine conflict, onto NATO soil’.[54] There are therefore long and short-term implications. This include concerns about NATO air space, space itself and satellites, cyber war, delivering weapons to Ukraine, cross-boarder incidents on refugees, of which 1.2M are now in Russia (women and children), the fears and realities of the use of unlawful weapons on civilians, and nuclear weapons. But there is no declaration of war against Russia from Allies. Tardy’s assessment is that Russia will attack if threatened but will more importantly attempt to take NATO territory – this may be land or an islands. It will also take opportunities to create divisions and to destroy alliances and can only be deterred by resistance.

Two important points: Rational Cost-Benefit Analysis for Policy Analysists and Military leaders is now more possible.

Russia has limited restraint (in just war theory).
Rationally a war in Ukraine is quantifiable, it is difficult to exclude attacks elsewhere.

NATO has more weapons and arsenal than Russia, with the exception of nuclear missles, with Russia holding a few more weapons. Statistics are available, via Statista, both on ground and air and personnel. In terms of miliary personnel NATO has 5,817,000 and Russia 1,330,900 the belief is that Russia has recently introduced conscription and is lowering the age of recruitment. Estimate are that NATO has probably about 20,633 aircraft and Russia about 4,182, in all areas such as flight interceptors, ground air force attack aircraft, special aircraft, tanker aircraft and helicopters, NATO has more resources to deploy than Russia. “The combined number of the US, UK and French 5,943 nuclear warheads, compared to Russia’s 5,9777”.[55] These can be checked against UN Weapons registers. Language about geo-political orders include the Northern Flank, discussed above and the Eastern Flank, allies and closely aligned countries, with NATO and the EU surrounding Russia’s Eastern borders, could host permanent US military bases on rotation for instance.[56] Tardy argues that Russia is in breach of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and this is in consideration when it comes to substantial and permanent troop deployment close to Russia’s borders. We are witnessing a more closely aligned collective security approaches and policies by European Governments, which could be described as a return to Collective Security in the Region, to produce collective defence.[57] There is global strategic competition with similar goals, NATO pacts with Sweden, Finland and Georgia and Ukraine constitutes as Tardy suggests a global shift in World Order, strengthening partnerships.

Scenarios like this may be considered for instance (Notes from Tardy 2022):

NATO defence could be widened.
There could be a no-fly zone over Ukraine which President Volodymyr Zelensky has called for,
But NATO has no legal obligation to fight for Ukraine, which means that it can try and win the war without waging war and by delivering weapons to Ukraine.
The balance of argument may change if there is further interference from Russia in countries like Kosovo and Georgia. NATO may intervene.
NATO’s door is open to membership from many more sovereign states (this process takes time, negotiations, and resource commitments).

Risks:

Russia uses chemical weapons.
The war becomes protracted and spills over into other states.

On the third point, it is important to consider how to access analysis on Ukraine, without compromising intelligence and national security. A modern approach to analysing the war in Ukraine, is already underway, lots of think-tanks publicly host events and provide written and audio material to inform academics and military and security advisors and policy advisors with accessible up to date information. The role of the media in providing information to the public during the crisis is important and should be considered as part of a strategy of providing essential information about daily events from journalists on the ground. They provide public information to academics, and institutions, as military information is often secret to protect operations and soldier in the field. For instance, this information from public sources is valuable and are uptodate. Timelines, maps provided by media organisations are also reliable. Governments also provide information in reports and reviews and press releases on Summits (negotiations), defence spending and statements about economic sanctions and international relations. Academic journals and paper provide further information about the events which have already taken place.

Three Scenarios for Ukraine on NATO membership

Ukraine’s’ membership of NATO is in negotiation from July 2023. One scenario had been a speedy acceptance of membership and approval by all NATO members, providing immediate strengthen to an Eastern Flank of NATO/EU aligned states, but given the processes in place this was least likely to happen in the Summer of 2023. At this stage, we are still merging EU political frameworks and policies with support for NATO in relation to Ukraine. A second foreseen scenario was set in course on 18 July 2023, the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg outlined, a positive major decision, which had been taken at the Vilnius Summit to support Ukraine towards NATO membership. The Press Statement outlines a way forward.

“At the Summit, Allies agreed a package of three elements bringing Ukraine closer to NATO membership. First, they agreed to remove the requirement for a Membership Action Plan, changing Ukraine’s membership path from a two-step process to a one-step process. Second, Allies established the NATO-Ukraine Council, a joint body of equals for consultation and decision-making. The Secretary General chaired the inaugural meeting with the participation of President Zelenskyy in Vilnius. Third, Allies agreed a multi-year support programme for Ukraine, covering critical needs like demining equipment, fuel, and medical supplies. Mr. Stoltenberg said that the NATO programme will also focus on building interoperability and ensuring that Ukraine transitions from Soviet equipment and doctrine to NATO standards. Looking ahead, Mr Stoltenberg said that Allies and partners will need to continue providing Ukraine with the military assistance it needs to prevail, and that NATO will stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes”.[58]

In this second scenario Ukraine will join NATO reasonably soon, a shorter process for membership, which suggests a faster road to membership for Ukraine, administrative arrangements are already being put in place – a joint process for decision making within NATO, and agreement to basic requirements and humanitarian aid, as well as agreed transition arrangements from Soviet equipment and doctrine, to the principles, rules and values of NATO Alliance – the final legal frameworks which entail full membership would also need to be agreed and signed by Ukraine. This scenario would strengthen the Eastern Flank Alliance in the medium to long term, whilst war continues. The risk of a much a later membership is that NATO could be accused by Russia of using Ukraine as a puppet state to uphold the Wests, it is already acting as a ‘buffer state’ for instance, to ensure deterrence from further Russian expansion. A third and final tragic scenario would be that Ukraine is absorbed into Russia and is annexed by the country. This is less likely due to EU commitmenst to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and more general support at the UN for sanctions against Russia, but not all countries disagree with President Putin at the UN he has some support from India, China, Venezuela and Turkey and South Africa which have acted as brokers for negotiations.

On the Ukraine-Russian Black Sea Deal of July 2022, transporting grain out of Ukraine, was partially successful from the Summer of 2022, but Russia has recently renegaded on wheat grain export agreement. Negotiations must take place to provide more hungry dependent nations with grain and reduce food insecurity in Eurasia and Africa. But Russia in the war has actively attacked grain stores in July 2023, which suggestions that negotiations and those agreements are not working. What can Turkey do? Despite the war and the breakdown of Russia-Western relations, it is important to understand that even during war time, nations will broker agreements to protect the most vulnerable people and nations, to prevent greater international problems through diplomacy.

What global agreement needs examining?

Russia has breached these agreements and it is now destroying grain stores, putting at risks many lives – Russia wanted to view and inspect vessels themselves and agreed to a truce on mining waters in the Black Sea. Turkey provided the diplomatic capacity space for some of those discussion and agreements to take place. Countries most dependent on wheat grain are set out below, lack of supply will result in global food insecurity. It is the geopolitics of the area and the Russian lead initiatives which have made these countries dependent on grain, as many belong to a wider system of international institutional alignment with Russia or through international trade agreements. Soo when considering the other side of the international relations coin, consider the international structures which Russia has also established since 2002. They also provide some insight into how Ukraine was expected to fit into those structures by Russia, and what in international policy terms this might mean to Ukraine, as it leaves and transitions the Soviet old systems still provided by Russia, to those of the EU/NATO. Russia might argue that it has modernised enough to sustain its equal share in global politics and that it is just in invading Ukraine, which it considers part of Russia.

Countries with import dependencies for Ukrainian wheat under Eurasian Economic Union and wider global agreements with individual countries in Africa, via Russian-African international relations.

Country	% dependency on wheat import	Country	% dependency on wheat import
Armenia	100%	Georgia	97.81%
Mongolia	100%	North Korea	97.84%
Benin	99.9%	Rwanda	92.36%
Kazakhstan	99.8%	Somalia	89.84%
Azerbaijan	98.62%	Moldovia	85.76%
Lao	98.39%	Palestine	85.13%

Data from Statista July 2023[59]

Russia’s post-Soviet infrastructure intended to keep neighbouring post-Soviet countries close, and so since 1991 and subsequent reforms, there was a vacuum for Russia to fill, as many break-away countries were unable to compete alone or join the EU, as a possible survival mechanism one option was for those states to join whatever supra-infrastructure Russia and its allies could provide in the Region of the former Soviet Union. In 1991, Russia created a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), creating in time agreements with its members a Free Trade Area and a collection of Security agreements, resulting in the Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), this created post-Soviet norms and values associated with the power of the new Russian Federation, providing hegemony for the Eurasian area. These organisations have run in parallel to NATO and Western Economic and Security Agreements, but within a post-Soviet system, not unlike some of the institutional organisations in the West. Work took place to establish a Single Economic Space, signed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russian and Ukraine in 2003 and this was ratified in 2004. So there is agreement of trade between nations, there is also The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU or EEU) which includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Russia within a Eurasian Union. Countries in these areas were said to have eliminated intra-bloc tariffs, common external tariffs, and eliminated non-tariff barriers, these can be largely centralizing mechanism, where Russian Oligarchs have grown in number and benefited vastly during this period, especially in trade in Russian oil and real-estate world-wide, when these arrangements were put in place, during 2010-2014. These institutional arrangement contribute to a combined $183GDP of countries GDP within the EAEU/EEU. The position of Ukraine is politically clear since the start of the war, hence NATO has decided to provide transitional arrangement for them to join in the future. Historically, since 2002 President Putin was open to discussions with the West, and it is said that he even asked to join NATO, and claimed to be open to democratization, but over time this intention or commitment was not sufficient to continue negotiations with the USA. Trust of President Putin had been put to the test, and over time he sought to create a powerful international system, which began to spread globally. Russia’s reach and influence in Europe and worldwide, has been felt for over a decade.

The first Russia-Africa Summit took place in Sochi in October 2019 and is declared to be recognised by the UN, and the organisation is integrated with the UN Charter. One could assume Russia was trying to help itself as a hegemonic power broker in the Region, approved by the international community to leverage power for the intention of humanitarian help to countries in need which align with its policies, providing a social and economic programme for Africa until 2063, following up on the UN’s Sustainability Goals for 2030.[60] It has a clear security agenda on weapons (and in weapons in space) and on co-operation with the UN. The organisation has clear intentions and commitments to prevent an arms race and maintain Peace. It is also clearly a forum in which African Nations can still discuss Peace and Co-operation, how Russia now behaves towards these states, in this forum will be very important as its resources are invested in conflict in Europe. Some of the members will have supported his actions in the Ukraine, others less so, and some states may have changed their minds about relations with Russia since the conflict began, (and the intervening months).

Twenty-one states attended the Russia-Africa Summit in St Petersburg on 26 July 2023, these are fewer states than in 2019, which were then 43. Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Nigeria have not sent representatives which from President Putin’s perspective will be a much less successful Summit. It may indicate that some support for him in the continent is waning. Egypt and Ethiopia will attend which suggests that there are some bigger negotiations to take place. Mali and the Central African Republic who are clients of contentious the paramilitary group Wagner are also attending the Summit. It is important to consider in IR analysis of the war, the wider power Russia still holds, and the outcome of discussion for Africa, especially South Africa which was torn between implementing the International Criminal Court (ICC’s) arrest warrant on allegations of war crimes in Ukraine, for President Vladimir Putin should he attend meeting in South Africa (Russia is not a member). Technology means he can attend remotely. What can South Africa and African leaders’ broker which meets any of the interests for global peace agreements certified by the UN?

Escalation of the War in Ukraine

ICC Charges relate to the treatment of Ukrainian soldiers, women and children in the field, and the strategy lead by the Kremlin of immense destruction of Ukrainian state infrastructure intended to cause the most harm to civilians, and recovery from conflict. Extreme violence by Russian soldiers against women and children and ordinary civilians have been documented, and demonstrate that the conflict is in breach of international humanitarian law. Cultural sites have been targeted, small villages, schools, theatres, and hospitals to cause heavy losses and impacting Ukrainian civilian moral. Refugee incidents across boarders have been registered as complaints against Russian soldiers and Paramilitary Groups such as Wagner have been outlawed, as terrorists, attempts to integrate them into the Russian military has not worked and 25,000 militia are free in countries such as Belarus, and even Russia. Belarus has also accepted nuclear warheads, leading to a build up of insecurity in parts of the Eastern Flank.

There are about 1.2M Ukrainian refugees in Russia, some have willing returned holding dual national status, and it has been reported that others have been forced to leave without financial support to go to neighbouring countries. Children have been reportedly forcibly removed from their Ukrainian families and brought Russia to be indoctrinated about Russian life and the war. Some have been returned after families have tried to recover their children. Over 1M Ukrainian refugees are in Germany, almost 1M in Poland, many are scattered in countries which are opposed to Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine. Terms used by President Putin about the war are ‘special operations’ in Ukraine, and that Ukraine was a Soviet creation, which has led to accusations of revisionism of history. Also, a rising fears and warnings amongst some states about antagonising Russia must be taken seriously in diplomatic discussions. The war has prompted a refugee crisis and a food crisis, which is compared to World War II, and pre-World War escalation. Governments worldwide must continue to work to prevent any further escalation, at the same time as strategically manoeuvring to defend territory and civilians militarily if needed, these are the dual purpose of just wars. A do-nothing miliary scenario, would also create an outcome, which has its risks and benefits associated with World Orders, through institutional realignment. Some Game theory could help work through some of those options, too see how viable and for how long such a position can hold, without compromising alliances, and state sovereignty amongst nations. I have written a paper on negotiations and game theory in relation to negotiation theories, which revives the matrix approach, The Art of Diplomacy, which explains the process for applying game theory to live situations, which can apply in a post-Soviet scenario conflict.[61]

Statistics of Ukrainian refugees since February 2021 to be confirmed by UN Refugee agencies.

Country	As of date	Number of refugees
Russia*	12/31/22	1,275,315
Germany	6/25/23	1,076,680
Poland	6/26/23	999,690
Czechia	7/9/23	352,315
United Kingdom	6/26/23	206,700
Spain	7/9/23	185,120
Italy	6/2/23	183,685
Bulgaria	7/11/23	162,935
Romania	7/10/23	137,760
Moldova	7/9/23	113,110
Slovakia	7/9/23	104,290
Austria	7/10/23	100,175
Netherlands	5/26/23	94,415

Data from Statista July 2023

Intentional attack on Ukrainian’s sovereignty

Returning to the first point, despite Russia’s extraordinarily powerful position in the world, and its integration of over 20 years by the International Community of states through multilateral actions, Russia has sought to integrate itself almost seamlessly into structures approved by those very same nations which now seek its demise – would seem paradoxical – are we not friends? The individual agenda pursued by President Putin to protect the Russian state and its economic interests is a very intentioned one. One could argue that given the development which has taken in Russia-African relations it is impossible to believe that there will not be a global paradox at play. That somehow, we will have missed the point of not just the war in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and actions in Georgia (hybrid war) to create disquiet in Kosovo in 2023 and neighbouring countries, to destabilise the area again, in order to expand Russia’s territory and influence once again. It is largely agreed that this is an imperialist style quest for resources and power. The diagram below from a BBC source is one of many resources available to the public on the war, there are a number of online trackers which show smaller and tiny movements on both sides, which enable anyone interested to track individual problem towns, cities, without compromising international security and military information.

Accounts of the war are harrowing, at the heart of understanding IR work in this area of study is that Russia’s identity and belief about itself has been attacked, hence its retaliation on Crimea and Ukraine. Mearsheimer has tried to shed some light on the topic in 2016, but what he does not describe in the balanced argument is that it was President Putin that opened up to the West, courting the USA for support, suggesting that they were pushing on an open door to democracy in many places. Therefore, the West’s decision to pursue the open-door policies and to seek to offer democracy to nations of the former Soviet Union, was not really unexpected and the consequences therefore and are not really the West’s fault – as they were acting upon invitation. Therefore, the perceived threat upon Russia, is a based on Russian misperceptions of self. The psychology of the nation and its Leader is therefore worth exploring and examining. Igor Zevelev (2016) work on Russian National Identity and Foreign Policy, describes Russian identity as based on history, size and necessity to protect its boarders, a great power with a distinct civilization. The identity is formed by the conception of a Russian Greater World transcending boarders, which is different from Western civilisation, this has shaped it view of boarders with Ukraine. The actions in Ukraine were ‘unexpected’ for Russia in 2014, and isolation from the global community was unwelcome. Mass protests in Russia and revolution in Ukraine prompted Russia to ‘securitize’ the question of identity, as necessary for its survival and therefore dispatched forces to Crimea in February 2014[62]. Russia, he says may look like another world, but it is important to understand on what this country’s identity is built upon and what implications it has had for Russia’s foreign policies. Russia cannot be the forever enemy he states, as President Putin cannot be here forever – this is true, but history remains, so what happens now is important. The war in Ukraine in 2022 was expected, given the heightened tensions between the two nations and Ukraine’s desire to break from Russia’s hold and join the EU and NATO, early signs in 2014 through the Euromaidan revolution removing a Pro-Putin Government. Russia responded by moving into Crimea – then the Donbas, creating two separate republics in Donetsk and Luhansk, as separate states within Ukraine – highly dangerous – the two nations signed the Minks Agreement to prevent further wars, but both areas were not completely settled and not without interference. The short static wars have involved trenches and tunnelling in the areas. This is what has threatened Russia most and its response has been aggressive tactics. It has provided support for Russo backed separatists in Ukraine, it has contributed to instability deliberately, it is said through cyber tactics, and naval incidents. Relatively small incidents in relation to what was to come, having penetrated Ukraine and then believing this to be settled proxy war, began to build military pressure on Ukraine’s borders, proceeded on a full-scale attack in February 2022.

Russo-Ukraine War 2022-

Russia continues to work, with greater effort than before and less successfully in the international multipolar world of Summits, but this ‘great bear’ has been wounded badly. World Order is increasingly becoming polarised on the issue of Ukraine, which is not unexpected. Maps and analysis on the war by journalists reveal a mix of traditional and untraditional warfare, use of modern technology like drones to collect information and intelligence.

Russia expected to enter Ukraine easily by encircling Kyiv and attacking surrounding cities, due to Ukrainian resistance it abandoned this strategy in April 2022. The level of resistance has been unprecedented and Russian Generals have commented publicly of greater losses. From August 2022, Ukraine embarked on a counteroffensive, successfully taking back territory, then Russia tried to annex four territories (which were not recognised Internationally) Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia. The war has continued over small towns and territories and municipal entities, then by a further counteroffensive in Kherson and Kharkiv, on in late August and then on 6 September 2022.

In terms of military strategy and Russian fortification to the Southwest of Ukraine in Crimea and shore has been extensive, it has embarked on extensive defensive work comparable to World War II (use of dragon’s teeth is one example), in preparation for the planned Ukrainian, counteroffensive planned in February 2023. Delays to the June 2023 Ukrainian counter-offensive due to resourcing of equipment, may have prolonged the war, but it has resulted in some gains in Bakhmut, since June and has resulted in Pro-Russian Wagner paramilitary forces to move out of the area, even rebelling and against President Putin himself, forcing a mutiny on Moscow (but stalled). This involved criticism of Russian Generals and Ministers and of the shelling of thousands of Wagner fighters, which preceded the rebellion.

Two events have impacted the war more recently; the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam on 6 June 2023, which has caused extensive damage to buildings into Crimea, both sides are affected as areas have been flooded and drained of irrigation waters for crops north, of the Dam into Ukraine. This has considerable impact on rescue and humanitarian needs, water pollution, water and food security are directly at risk. Ukraine wishes to regain both areas. Both sides have blamed each other for the extensive damage, Russia Ukraine of terrorist acts. It is likely that the dam had been weakened earlier in the war and that it may have breached. Then there is the dangers around the nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhia.

Media coverage of the timeline of events in Ukraine since 2014

Reuters Source: Editing by Silvia Aloisi; Editing by Frank Jack Daniel

April 2014: Pro-Russian separatists in the eastern region of Donbass declare independence. Some 15,000 people have been killed since 2014 in fighting between the separatists and the Ukrainian army, according to the Kyiv government. 2017: An association agreement between Ukraine and the EU opens markets for free trade of goods and services, and visa-free travel to the EU for Ukrainians. 2019: Former comic actor Volodymyr Zelenskiy is elected president. Jan. 2021: Zelenskiy appeals to U.S. president Joe Biden to let Ukraine join NATO. In February, his government freezes the assets of opposition leader Viktor Medvedchuk, the Kremlin’s most prominent ally in Ukraine. Spring 2021: Russia begins massing troops near Ukraine’s borders in what it says are training exercises. Nov. 2021: Satellite images taken by Maxar Technologies show ongoing buildup of Russian forces near Ukraine with estimates soon surpassing 100,000 troops deployed. Dec. 17 2021: Russia presents security demands including that NATO pull back troops and weapons from eastern Europe and bar Ukraine from ever joining. Jan. 24 2022: NATO puts forces on standby and reinforces eastern Europe with more ships and fighter jets. Jan. 26: Washington responds to Russia’s security demands, repeating a commitment to NATO’s “open-door” policy while offering a “pragmatic evaluation” of Moscow’s concerns. Two days later Russia says its demands not addressed. Feb. 2022: Amid growing Western fears Russia could attack Ukraine, the United States says it will send 3,000 extra troops to NATO members Poland and Romania. Washington and allies say they will not send troops to Ukraine, but warn of severe economic sanctions if Russian President Vladimir Putin takes military action. Feb. 21: In a TV address, Putin says Ukraine is an integral part of Russian history and has a puppet regime managed by foreign powers. Putin orders what he called peacekeeping forces into two breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine, after recognising them as independent. Feb. 22: The U.S., Britain and their allies’ sanction Russian parliament members, banks and other assets in response to Putin’s troop order. Germany halts the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project. Feb. 23: Russian-backed separatist leaders ask Russia for help repelling aggression from the Ukrainian army. Feb. 24: Putin authorizes “special military operations” in Ukraine. Russian forces begin missile and artillery attacks, striking major Ukrainian cities including Kiev. Feb. 26: Western allies announce new sanctions, including restrictions on Russia’s central bank and expelling key banks off the main global payments system.

Future Problems

Arlinda Rrustemi (2020) has examined far-right trends in Southeastern Europe, for The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, she has stated, “In the last few years, violent extremists’ trends have been researched in South-Eastern Europe (SEE) incorporating Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia from various perspectives of risks, to organised crimes, community resilience and drivers for disengagement”. Until more recently focus had been placed on Islamic extremism and risks, with ethno-nationalism ideas supporting that model of assessment, but ignoring far right extreme violence. She raises which countries are most affected, what drives them and how this might impact NATO and the EU. One additional point is that external forces on countries are described as Russian and from the ‘mother state’. Several points arise in her work, first that an unstable SEE region will create potential spillover such as conflicts, corruption, and crime.[63] These pose security risks in Europe- North Macedonia, seems to be more stable, Montenegro and Albania are the least affected. Countries of concern include Serbia, which is highly affected, with Russian support for far-right organisations, there is evidence to disinformation campaigns, which cause mistrust, towards the EU and NATO, and their targets are Slavic citizens, such as Republican Srpskai, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and the Northern Area of Kosovo. The Political elite in Serbia and foreign fighters in Ukraine are linked with the Russian government as well. Paramilitary groups have connections to the Russian government and co-ordinate proxy wars. Disinformation is successful, efficient and cost-effective for Russia which promotes an anti-Western Narrative. Serbian fighters serve in combat and counterintelligence, supporting pro-Russian paramilitary units.[64] These are forms of proxy-wars intended to destabilise countries. It has sought to be an anti-terrorist partner; often Muslim people are targeted. She states in a publication for The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, “this strategy creates a space for Russia to use Orthodox Christian solidarity to prevent itself as an alternative to the West for the Slavic populations in the region. Thus, Russia uses religious and cultural influence through the Orthodox Church in Serbia. Politicians have close, contact with the Orthodox Church in Serbia and have extended this influence”.[65] These influences should not be ignored going forward. Kosovo, she states is also highly affected by Russian influence in the area and more recently these events have begun to show some strain and there have been attempts to destabilise the country by-proxy. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia is promoting far-right paramilitary groups. “Russia’s military influence derives from supplying weapons, and from the creation of shared training centres. The Country entered into an agreement in 2016 to partner on intelligence collected for counter terrorism, cybercrime, and police training. The police have also been increasingly militarised [with rifles and anti-air missiles from Russia]. These also facilitate the far-right in Bosnia”.[66]

The second problem is the EU’s dependence on Russian oil and gas, war in Ukraine has highlighted the significance of this dependency. The Russian deputy PM we have every right to take a matching decision and impose an embargo on gas pumping through the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has urged the EU neither to extend nor to sign new contracts with Gazprom (March 2022). The EU has begun to explore options for diversification of gas supply – where Russia has provided 40% the gas in the EU.[67] The EU has resolved to reduce the use of Russian gas by 2/3rds by the end of the year. The purpose of the strategy is to maximise the sanctions and the ban on Russian oil imports. Gazprom has been owned by Russian oligarchs and the strategy is to remove as much money as possible, where it could be used against Ukraine, by supporting President Putin’s – Oligarchs and the Russian state machinery which feeds them. It is expected that the world does not have enough capacity to replace Russian output, “even by tapping US, Norwegian and Saudi Arabia”. [68] Which has implications for Persian Gulf countries, release of US reserves may help, but international relations and diplomacy are key to getting this right. One big elephant in the room is that the EU will have to reduce demand on energy – this is much easier in the Summer than the Winter. In 2023 the Council adopted a 15% gas demand reduction target and became mandated on 1 April 2023.

Russia has ties with China and expectations before the war were that China would provide a balance of power in the Region, possibly holding back more Russian aggression in the eyes of the West. China’s President has not been outspoken against President Putin and continues diplomatic ties with Russia. It is more powerful than Russia and has more trade with the Western World. Questions arise more recently about whether this trust in China by the international community is misplaced and whether China’s role in providing a balance of power in World Order, along with the USA, and economic stability in political economy, may not be the role it seeks under existing Western rules. China’s growth has been strong, but it is not prepared to test its currency further in the international community, unlike the US dollar. In moments of crisis, it could offer the World more economic stability.

Accusation of influence in academia and business in the institutions of Western nations is of great concern, as there have been overt attempts to change the Western political narrative, when critical views are unwelcome. Networks of Chinese residents are also under the influence of the Chinese government under Xi Jingping and The Communist Party, through networks, and this have been raised by the UK Government as matter of concern.

As Dimitry Tenin (2015) publishing at the Carnegie Moscow Centre has pointed out, “The rapture between Russia and the West stemming from the 2014 crisis over Ukraine has wide-ranging geopolitical implications. Russia has reverted to its traditional position as a Eurasian power – between East and West, tilting towards China”.[69] It did not condemn Russia in the 2014 Ruso-Ukraine conflict in Crimea, it has developed into a partner of Russia in ‘greater Asia’, and is part of Russia’s sphere of influence. Russia would support China in its competition with the USA, challenge the G7, and there is a developing strategic position between the two countries. Both leaders have an affinity which did not exist before their Premierships, and they work together to empower non-western international institutions, such as the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) a Eurasian economic, political and security organisation supporting the BRICS Group of nations, which include partners such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. These arrangements make diplomacy complex on the issue and war in Ukraine for both Russia and the West. The 14^th BRICS Summit took place in China in 2022 and it is seeking to expand membership to developing countries. Russia would not want to become a vassal nation, if we include the Mongol Empire as contested territory in the past – it is after a ‘great power status’. Sino-Russian conflicts are less likely because of these reasons. China under the treaties of 1858-1860, lost territories to Russia, but has not tried to take them back, but instead has developed a shared co-leadership role in SCO. China respects Russian redlines and gives arms to India (India also has economic opportunities through BRICS), its lines against Japan which is perceived as a threat on the Sen Kaku Islands, Russia is expected to keep its neutrality – but for how long? The Sino-Russian Entente remains strong. Russia cannot fear isolationism too much and knows it is not along, even as the war in Ukraine wages these institutions remain, without polarising the world further. Ukraine has a lot of diplomatic work to do in Africa and elsewhere to counter Russian diplomacy.

Global polarising views on democratisation and the purpose of interdependence in competition with these systems politically, economically, and even militarily is an unprecedented reordering of states and power structures impacting World Order, which is being pulled in multilateralism and bilateral arrangements, all the time by nations with differing agenda. However, the division between nations remains as before, between the East and the West. There does appear to be an asymmetry at times, but power structures in the region are clearly aligning around North Korea, China, and Russia and then the USA, South Korea, and Japan in the Indo Pacific Region. Tensions here could escalate. There is potential further destabilising force, North Korea is also an alley to Russia and we are witnessing the dramatic alienation of Russia from Europe and from Russia in a polarised arrangement and the two are in direct competition for resources, trade, values and international systems and diplomatic time. It is therefore an unlikely strategic partner for the future, even if President Putin is removed, Russian elites will continue with the current imperialist agenda, but for how long it is difficult to gage – war requires people to fight them, financing, and resources.

Conclusion

The Framework for analysing the war in Ukraine is based on known theories in international relations and its applications. It must be possible to discuss just war in Ukraine within a theoretical framework, to discuss the ethical rational and dialectic without causing any destabilisation of the current agreed and legal position. The theoretical processes can help us answer questions about many conflicts worldwide, and the application of Cold War style game theory to work through scenarios are not wrong, but may seem at times limited or dated, yet they are still relevant to the realities of war. The question above may help policy makers to think about the Russo-Ukraine conflicts.

The war has escalated quickly, and the current counteroffensive is pushing Russia back into areas it has occupied since 2014. NATO may find some funding pressures in the future, due to existing or new commitments eased possibly Sweden’s new membership most likely to come in the coming year, and Finland. Questions arise as to whether President Putin can survive the criticism he has received internally and whether he may be deposed by other Russian elites. Should the war escalate, NATO involvement the international community would be looking at the reparation of countries, rather than just one country, as the refugee crisis has also exacerbated some state problems for countries such as Poland. The expectation is that Russia would pay for the repair of damage caused to Ukraine, to repair its infrastructure. The outcome of a maxim in war may include humanitarian assessments within Russia of civilians to ensure some balance on what is happening across borders to soldiers and civilians, this would involve the application of international humanitarian law. NATO expansion will threaten President Putin further and he is likely to rally neighbouring states who support Russian policies.

NATO expansion is a threat to Putin’s Russia but offers many opportunities for countries who want part of the free world. At the Summit in Vilnius in July 2023. Sweden approved by Turkey (the USA has met Turkey’s demands for F-16 planes), it is now more eligible to join NATO changing political alignments in the EU, and enables us all to redraw lines, as the list of members continues to increase.[70] Ukraine is also likely to become a member relatively soon, this is a positive outcome for Ukraine, who at present is not in a position to fund its membership, but has political support from NATO members, too much strain on Ukraine will be difficult as the war continues and its ability to meet NATO commitments are genuine. Concerns about a third World War are real and Ukraine’s membership of NATO will happen in due course once it meets the necessary criteria. However disappointing, this is in Ukraine’s best interests. The EU supports Ukrainian integrations as well, once it is ready.

On Monday 19 June 2023, President Putin Rejected a peace plan for Ukraine, despite appeals from African leaders who had hoped to persuade him and President Zelensky to end the war in Ukraine. President Ramaphosa of South Africa urged both sides to seek a ceasefire “through negotiations and diplomatic means”, based on 10 principles including de-escalated and security guarantees. African leaders also called for unimpeded grain exports through the Black Sea and for both sides to return prisoners of war and children displaced by the conflict. This conversation took place before the Russo-African Summit. President Putin has rejected both.

Bibliography

Aquinas, Thomas (1988) On Politics and Ethics, Translated and Edited by Paul E.Sigmund, A Norton Critical Edition.

Cahill, Sowle Lisa (2019) Blessed are the Peacemakers: Pacifism, Just War, and Peacebuilding. Fortress Press.

Clausewitz, Carl Von (1997) On War, Translated by J.J Graham. Wordsworth Classics of World Literature.

Coates, Anthony (2003) Just War in Political Concepts. Manchester University Press.

De Maio, Giovanna (2016) Russia’s View of Ukraine after the Crisis, Institutio Affari Internagionali. Feb.

Fowler, C Mayhill (2015-2016) Beyond China and Little Russia: Going Global in Ukraine. Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol 34, No.14, The Future of the Past: New Perspectives a Ukrainian History pp259-284.

Heraclides, Alexis And Dialla, Ada (2012: 2015) Chapter Two, Humanitarian Intervention in the Long 19^th Century: setting the Precedent, pp14-30, Manchester University Press.

Krastev, Ivan and Mark Leonard (2022) The Crisis of European Security: What Europeans Think about the War in Ukraine. European Council on Foreign Relations, February.

Kusa, ILiya (2022) Russia-Ukraine War: Harbinger of Global Shift Policy Perspective from Ukraine. Current Affairs, Policy Perspectives, Vol 19, No1, pp7-12.

Mearsheimer, John (2014) Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s fault. Vol.93. No.5 Sep/Oct 2014, p77-84, 85-89.

Reichberg, Gregory M (2010) Thomas Aquinas Between Just War and Pacifism. The Journal of With Religious Ethics. Vol.38. No.2, pp219-241.

Rrustemi, Arlinda (2020) Far Right Trends in South Eastern Europe: The Influences of Russia, Croatia and Albania: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.

Schenk, B Frithjot (2019) European Regions and Boundaries: A Conceptual History. Berghaha Books.

Sigmund, Paul E (1998) St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics. A Norton Critical Edition.

Surwillo, Izabela, Slakaityte, Vermika (2022) With Energy at Play in the Ukraine War, Everybody Pays”, March 2022.

Tardy, Thiery (2022) Ukraine, NATO, and the Madrid Strategic Concept. War in Europe: preliminary lessons, May pp13-24.

Tenin, Dimitri (2015) From Geater Europe to Greater Asia? The Sino-Russian Entente. Carnegie Moscow Centre.

Wartman, Richard (2013) The Russian Empire and Russian Monarchy: the problem with Russian nationalism. Academic Studies Press.

Williams, Paul (Second Edition 2013) Security Studies An Introduction. Routeldge, Taylor and Francis Group.

Zevelev, Igor (2016) Russian National Identity and Foreign Policy. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Report of CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program.

Podcasts

RUSI The Royal Services Institute: Western Way of War Podcast Series. Western Way of War Podcasts | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)

Episode 65: Katarzyna Zysk: Russian Creativity and Risk Taking

Episode 66: Prof Jim Holmes: There is a Problem with Western Navies

Episode 75: Dr Matthew Harries, Matters of nuclear weapons.

Episode 76: Ben Wallace: Not Tinkering around the Edges

Episode 77: So What did We Learn if Anything?

Global Security Briefing Podcasts at RUSI

Episode 48: Finland, the UK and Northern and Northern European Security: Northern Flank

19 April 2023

Episode 44: A Year of Russia’s War in Ukraine

22 Feb 2023

Episode 33: How is Japan Rethinking its Role in International Security?

Media News

Note:

Time Line of Ukraine Post-1989 Timeline: The events leading up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine | Reuters Editing by Silvia Aloisi; Editing by Frank Jack Daniel

BBC iplayer Documentaries: Taking Control Series on President Putin BBC iPlayer – Putin, Russia and the West

[1] Chris Brown, Terry Nardin and Nicholas Rengger. International Relations in Political Thought, Texts from the Ancient Greeks to The First World War, Cambridge University Press, 2002.

[2] Niccolo Machiavelli The Art of War, Edited by Christopher Lynch, The University of Chicago Press, 2003. And Carl von Clausewitz, On War Translated by J.J Graham, revised by F.N Maude, Wordsworth Classics of World Literature.

[3][3] Chris Brown et al IR and Political Thought, on Samuel Pufendorf, pages 341-348.

[4] Ibid pages 347.

[5] Robert Cox Approaches to World Order Critical Theory, with Tim Sinclair, Cambridge University Press. 1996.

[6] Matt Davies, IR Theory: Problem Solving vs Critical Theory? IR Theory: Problem-Solving Theory Versus Critical Theory? (e-ir.info), 2014. E-International Relations.

[7] John Mearsheimer, % dependency on wheat import Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault, The Liberal Discussion that provoked Putin, Foreign Affairs Vol 193, No5, Sep/Oct 2014, pp77-84, 85-89.

[8] Frithjof Benjamin, Schenk, Memories of history, European Regions and Boundaries: A Conceptual History, Chapter 9, Berghanhn Books 2019.

[9] Matt Davies IR Theory: Problem-Solving Theory Versus Critical Theory? (e-ir.info).

[10] Deepshikha Shahi, Critical International Theory: A Comparative Advantage Framework, 7 April 2017. Critical International Theory: A Comparative Advantage Framework (e-ir.info)

[11] Ibid,

[12] Ibid,Shahi recommends reading Cox, Robert W. 1992 ‘Towards a Post-hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order’ in James N. Rosenau and Ernest Otto-Czempiel (eds.) Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, pp. 132-160.

[13] Western Way of War Podcasts | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org) Episode 72: Russian Borderisation Policy, on Georgia. Hybrid warfare is used by Russian in its modern context in Georgia. Episode 72: Natia Seskuria: Russian Borderisation Tactics | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)

[14] Chris Brown et al International Relations, in Political Thought, Cambridge Press, 2002. P314-315.

[15] Ibid pages 315.

[16] Ibid pages 316.

[17] Thomas Aquinas, Between Just War and Pacifism, The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol 38.No2,pp219-241.

[18] Reference from St Augustine of Hippo City of God.

[19] Ibid pages 173.

[20] As Miller asserts primacy of restraint over action and aggression over anything else. See G Reichberg.

[21]

[22] Gregory Reichberg, Thomas Aquinas Between war and Pacifism, the Journal of Religion and Ethics Vol.38, No.2 pp219-241.

[23] Humanitarian intervention in the long nineteenth century, Manchester University Press, 2015, pp14-30.

[24] Ibid page 14.

[25] Ibid page 14.

[26] Anthony Coates, Just War in Political Concepts, Manchester University Press, 2003 pages 212.

[27]

[28] Ibid pages 217.

[29] Ibid pages 219.

[30] Ibid pages 214.

[31] Ibid Episode 72: Natia Seskuria: Russian Borderisation Tactics | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)

[32]Richard Wartman The Russian Empire and Russian Monarchy: The Problem of Russian Nationalism. Academics Studies Press.

[33] A disciple of Gregory of Siani. Who also followed and implemented the Palamite Doctrine a critical element of the Eastern Orthodox Doctrine.

[34] Richard Wartman. The Russian Empire and the Russian Monarchy: The Problem of Russian Nationalism. Academic Studies Press, pages 225.

[35] Ibid pages 225.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid pages 226-7.

[38] Ibid pages 230.

[39] Frithjof Benjamin Schenk 2019, Memories of History, Europeans and Regions and Boundaries: A Conceptual History, Berghaha Books, Chapter 9, pages 189-190.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid. References Maxwell.

[42] Mayhill C Fowler (2015-16) Beyond Ukraine or Little Russia: Going Global with Ukraine. Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol 34, No14, The Future of the Past: New Perspectives on Ukrainian History, pp2259-284.

[43] Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard (2022) The Crisis of European Security: What Europeans Think About War in Ukraine. Eureopan Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).

[44] Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard (2022) The Crisis of European Security: What Europeans Think About the War in Ukraine: What Europeans Think About the War in Ukraine. ECFR. Feb 2022.

[45] Ibid.

[46] A case for Upstream Capacity Building, Co-authored with William George, British Army Review, Number 182, Spring 2023, pp46-51.

[47] The inherently imperial motivations behind Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine and its approach to the war have significant implications for Western support to Ukraine and the prospects for a just peace.

[48] The crisis of European security: What Europeans think about the war in Ukraine | ECFR

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

52 – Now £2.8bn in July 2023.

[53] Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world (publishing.service.gov.uk) A list of funding commitments by the Government can be found here, also a list of military resources provided to Ukraine. Praise for Ukraine support as Defence industry offers more help – GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

[54] Thiery Tardy (2022) Ukraine, NATO and the Madrid Strategy Concept, War in Europe: Preliminary lessons, May 1, 2022, p13-24.

[55] NATO Russia military comparison 2023 | Statista

[56] Ibid pages 16.

[57] Ibid page 20.

[58] NATO – News: Secretary General to Ukraine Defense Contact Group: NATO support will continue for as long as it takes, 18-Jul.-2023

[59] Russia-Nato Military Comparisons NATO Russia military comparison 2023 | Statista.

[60] Russia-Africa Relations. Declaration of the First Russia–Africa Summit (summitafrica.ru),

[61] (DOC) The ‘Art of Diplomacy’ in an era of ‘Open Diplomacy’: Public and Secret Diplomacy negotiations. Has diplomacy lost its resonance in a more open diplomatic world? | Rocio Ferro-Adams (please cite if using this work at Research Capacity) – Academia.edu

[62] Igor Zevelev (2016) Russian National Identity and Foreign Policy, Centre for Strategic and Intentional Studies, Report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program. Page 3.

[63] Dr Arlinda Rrustemi (2020) Far Right Trends in South Eastern Europe: The Influences of Russia, Croatia, Serbia and Albania: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies Publication page 12. [PDF] Far-Right Trends in South Eastern Europe: The Influences of Russia, Croatia, Serbia and Albania | Semantic Scholar

[64] Arinda Rrustemi (2020): Far right trends in Southeastern Europe: The Influences of Russia, Croatia, Serbia and Albania: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.

[65] Ibid, page 4.

[66] Ibid.

[67] an Izabela Sarwillo (2022) With Energy at Play in the Ukraine War, Every Body Pays. How much energy does the EU import from Russia? | World Economic Forum (weforum.org) UK ban on Russian oil and oil products – GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

[68] Ibid.

[69] Dimitri Tenin (2015) From Greater Europe to Greater Asia? The Sino-Russian Entente (April 2015), Carnegie Moscow Centre.

[70] Can Vladimir Putin survive? by Chatham House (soundcloud.com). And Independent Thinking: NATO membership for Ukraine (just not right now) | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank

@ReseachCapacityLtd.

The Changing World Order: the impact on global international relations and international security, as a consequence of war between Ukraine and Russia.

Share this:

Leave a comment Cancel reply