By Rocio Ferro-Adams                                                                             25 March 2025

How is the geopolitical arena being re-drawn after President Trump tears up the existing rules-based order, on trade and commitments to Europe?

Since his appointment to Office, President Trump has made a number of statements, which has turned into US policies, resulting in the reorganisation of government and State Departments. The immediate impact of these policies affects global diplomacy at all levels (for the USA and other nations).  The significance of which is that history appears to be made in days and not over decades anymore.  Two areas of significant importance appear to be the use of tariffs and those new geopolitical alliances being redrawn into recognisable moments of realpolitik, resulting in significant redrawing of political alignments within Western Europe, to defend Ukraine and to manage the potential for spill over into neighbouring countries. These countries include Poland, Slovakia, Estonia, and Latvia. President Trump genuinely wishes to end the war in Ukraine and most likely to reduce the threat of Russia in the Region, which would mean a much greater compromise than Ukraine and Europe are currently willing to make over sovereignty, national freedoms and the values shared by its allies.

International relations and legal obligations require states to work with the new President, he is making seismic shifts to change the order in which the United States (US) operates within the international system, in political terms and within trade structures. It is still early days, but he has made two enormous shifts happen already. First in his attempts to close off wars in Gaza and Ukraine within a couple of months of taking Office. Secondly, by seeking a continued policy programme of ‘America First’, and ‘Making America Great Again’. Policies intended to attack and curtail the remnants of the old Democrat Administration’s policies, attitudes and allegiances, this is a highly personalised Presidentship already, focused on a single figure and World Leader. Secondly, The President is exercising power, through his delegates, there are the normal links to business billionaires, but their degrees of influence on society may be more significant as opinion makers in the world of media and it is worth noting the owners of Meta and X such as Mark Zuckerberg, and Elon Musk (formally twitter). Newly appointed officials and his Vice-President JD Vance, who are creating and closing Government Departments, seeking efficiencies around jobs about diversity and ‘woke’ agendas, whilst making certain jobs in government redundant within this very short period since his inauguration as President and then the rehiring of government employees, demonstrates some impatience not to carry out employment assessments or reviews on government institutions before cutting jobs. Thirdly, it is also an attack on liberal values and economic models, making some senior economists and opinion makers in the USA and Europe nervous and the also the greater public, as inflation is higher than expected and taxes are rising.

Attempts to protect American markets such as the automobile industry, oil, and traditional American goods, may backfire as the President raises tariffs in the short-term within, what has become over decades – since 1956, a recognisably complex market and an inter-dependent arrangement of supply chains and manufacturing for several important decades from the 1980s, through a period of globalisation of markets and trading.  However, in International Relations, states exist in an international global order and exist in complex interdependency. This is especially the case in Europe where the English School and the Western liberal order developed and continues to exist amongst states which exhibit state society behaviours and norms.

Themes arising from the first six weeks of President Trump’s Presidency:

• American soft diplomacy has been weakened; with ‘great power’ or ‘spheres of influence’ strategy options being favoured by the Trump Administration. Active challenges to the norms and values of existing diplomacy between traditional key allies has already begun; rattling NATO, challenging norms around the war in Ukraine and America’s  traditional conservative less than warm relationship with Russia, followed by cuts on international aid.  Russia also wishes to change the existing World Order, through structural change in areas which weaken its interests, and it will seek ways in which to do that. It is driven ideologically by national self-interest and a suspicion of the West’s perceived ‘double standards’ in international relations.[1]
• President Trump wishes to end a War in Ukraine and Gaza (which is just holding a form of political ceasefire but in reality remains in conflict), but he is seeking to create a system of Great Power politics, by decoupling from existing commitments in Ukraine, and using the suspension of US aid for projects around the world as a means of shifting focus and influence to where he believes attention should be. These decisions may begin to cause famine, or poverty and disease such as HIV, in vulnerable states where it had been largely erased – but where social vulnerability remained, and aid had been supporting localised projects. He may seek leverage over those affected countries in time, where a vacuum of health, education, and institutional support had been created through wars and had been filled by aid instead. In areas where communities relied on democratisation or civil society, development projects may have been crucial for ensuring stability.

The Russo-Ukraine war

• President Putin may be prepared to negotiate with President Trump as the leader of the Democratic World. He is unlikely to want to give up territory already gained in Ukraine. Russia is unlikely to give up its expansionist intentions overtime on the Eastern Flank of Europe, which logically means that Europe should expect overspill into democratised parts of Eastern Europe overtime. Commentators suggest this could be between 5-10 years. This creates an urgent geopolitical situation in Europe that would require urgent defence spending attention to deter further invasions in the future. Russia may accept a 30-day ceasefire negotiated by Trump for Kyiv in March.  President Putin may have already calculated a need for a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine with negotiations over territory beginning more publicly this month. This longer-term ceasefire may be an opportunity for Russia to reflect upon, or an opportunity to re-arm over five years, a pause, in preparation for another attack in Europe.[2] A Black Sea ceasefire is now expected, by Russia and Ukraine on energy infrastructure, it may be early signs of this war ending.
• Internationally, Europe (the EU)  and the UK and its Allies, also need to be minded that North Korean forces have already joined Russia in Ukraine. This means that treatment of soldiers under international law must apply to the treatment of Ukrainian or foreign trained soldiers supporting the Ukrainian army and also captured Russian and North Korean soldiers. There have been during the war successful and less successful prisoner swaps which have been documented. In Seoul, South Korea has already reached out to Ukraine, stating that it will take back North Korean soldiers who wish to go to the South.[3]
• The beginning of negations on Ukraine had not gone well in January, President Trump had already made concession that were far too large for Ukraine and Europe, prompting a UK Led Contact Meeting in Europe – it was the sharp response from the US which suggested that it would no longer commit to European Defence, and that it was time for European Powers to invest in their own defence spending at the meeting – the message was that this issue was now of a vital importance. It became a pressing issue within a few weeks across nations such as the UK, France, and Germany. By February, European Heads of States meetings between France and President Trump and UK Prime Minister Starmer paved the way for a differing perception on the war and how it should end. These meetings raised  questions about continued US spending commitments to NATO, the Russo-Ukraine War and Western Defence Programmes and Defence commitments such as AUKUS (impacting Australia and geopolitically Western Allies such as Japan). Soundings suggest the US will follow through on its commitments there also, but it is too soon to document.[4] It has become increasingly urgent for European nations to reconsider and raise national defence spending. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark have already moved to protect and secure their defence forces against Russian aggression, by investing in military spending and human resources more heavily. Since 2018 here has been a growing need for a renewed purpose for NATO, when Russia was identified as the greatest threat to western nations, this threat will provide the impetus for any reforms.[5]
• A restructuring of relationships with the USA may be a key strategy from the Kremlin – And it may seek advantage where America begun to alienate itself from Canada, Mexico, the EU and the UK through rhetorical threats and then by launching a trade war, using tariffs as a ‘carrot and stick’ approach to leverage power and negotiations with these states – they may have shown some desired and rational outcomes in relation to Mexico, but largely the early rhetoric appeared to be destabilising and dysfunctional to diplomacy and relations. Within six weeks it has resulted in some friction, with far reaching consequences on international institutions, borders, and trade. Exposed, the US is now open to the accusation of being under the influence of Russia, at the start of the Second Trump Presidency. But both Europe and the UK continue to open diplomatic talks. These have been choppy waters to navigate, as the US President suspended military aid and intelligence to Ukraine, and throwing Tariff’s at the EU, causing anxiety in the markets and dramatically impacting Ukraine’s ability to retain its captured lands in the Russian Kursk region. These acts may weaken American international position in the future, unless President Trump can successfully defend America’s interests and democratic norms, as well as maintaining bonds with America’s Allies, whilst balancing foreign policy commitments .
• How is President Trump projecting his fears into the future, may reflect his concerns for the future? He may expect to be dealing with the far-right of European political parties in the future, as these parties have risen in popularity across Europe, he may also perceive European nations preparing for a future bigger war. He must be reassured through European diplomacy, that includes the UK,  that it can take responsibility for future events and defence of its nations. The President may be acting out of fear, or intuition, of what may come – causing instability in the international order. This is an expression of the human condition, which can be managed through diplomacy.[6] Alternatively, he can also be blamed for the confusion caused and some unwelcome behaviours and rhetoric which have previously upset America, and Democratic voters and let that affect his Second Presidency, to the point where he aligns with more of the same aggressive rhetoric and even more extreme groups on the right. This is a time of tension, and the behaviours of state leaders are visibly more nervous; powerful, decisive, but also more diplomatic in character, reflective of other ‘pre-war times’ in another era of European diplomatic discussion.
• In the scheme of great power geopolitics and the realities of long-term nuclear deterrence. Peace in Ukraine will require the US and Russia to agree on an overall ceasefire, for Ukraine, ‘but not without its agreement and on a fairer footing’, including perhaps acceptance of future NATO membership and EU application for accession as part of a package towards longer-term peace. Although by March, the US President with European assurances had shifted diplomacy significantly, this has not deterred continuing war yet. Through the European Council President Ursula Von Der Leyen and EC Heads of States meetings with Canada, they were able to steer negotiations after the two Presidents initial failed meeting in February. Diplomacy has also included independent meetings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which hosted discussions between Russia and US Representatives, but there is still no public ‘package of agreements’ for peace.
• Ukraine has subsequently managed to agree a peace deal, which President Trump hoped to take to President Putin by 14 March 2025.  This turn around has been the result of active efforts by President Zelensky and his team, and UK counterparts such as UK PM Kier Starmer and EU leaders such as President Macron, and the new German Chancellor who have responded to reactions to that failed meeting between the US President and President Zelensky in February, through statements of renewed commitments for Ukraine -.  President Zelensky was able to woe the US President back, through his documented appreciation and desire to keep the President as an ally.  Ukraine’s need for US commitments, has resulted in an agreed ‘rare minerals deal’, as part of what is to become a wider settlement, for continued American financial military aid; that has since been agreed and implemented by 11 March 2025.
•  Because of this suspension in US military aid, much of Ukrainian territorial gains in Russia which could have been used for negotiations, have been lost in a very short period. Most likely due to shared intelligence and subsequent raised confidence, by Russia, that Ukraine did not have the US President’s full support. By 19 March President Putin was continuing to authorise rocket launches into Ukraine, despite a 90-minute telephone call with President Trump that week and an agreement between the two Presidents that a ceasefire would be needed, for a Peace Agreement, and that the targeting of energy infrastructure would cease. [7] It appears that President Putin does not want to accept the Ukraine-US stance on intelligence sharing  and military aid. The position between the US-Russia still needed to be determined on 23 March, as President Putin continues to wage war.[8] President Zelensky will not want to drag out the war and has called for Allies to block attempts by Russia to do so.[9]
• PM Donald Tusk of Poland has also responded by assuring other Western nations of his desire to keep Russia out.  He suggested on 13 March 2025 that the US should position nuclear weapons on Polish soil, to deter Russia from further future aggression. This requires some European securities assessment to giving those weapons, but Ukraine and neighbouring countries may welcome such as commitment. The US keeps weapons in a few European states, including in the UK and Germany, which has formed part of the Western strategic defence Alliance for decades. Breaking those arrangements would be a dramatic change in the status of those Alliances.

There is a question over the narrative, which is developing around the US President, and how mainstream American dogma, popular Republican grassroots values (49.8% of American voters) and political ideology, shape his vision as a world leader and then subsequently impacts his negotiations with other world leaders. Whether the President can, and whether he should, disassociate himself from that enough and what he believes can be challenging for the new Administration.

• A desire for a Golden Age for America, which draws on the language of post-World War I uncertainty, that creates the perception that America is failing to provide jobs at home, and that protecting American economy is the only way forward, is the ‘new direction for change’, a plan set out from his first Presidency from January 2017-2021. This is not a complete picture of reality, almost half of voters (48.3%) voted Democrat and these people did not agree with his vision of America. American jobs are also created via interdependence in production, services and manufacturing across borders with its largest neighbours Canada and Mexico, and so the idea of a Golden Age implies a reversal of those arrangements, suggesting that this will need to happen for some reason such as a fear of World War III. This agenda for change implies a structural change in certain areas of the global economy to create another American Golden Age. Increasing Tariffs on imported goods from countries like China, where he argues there are deficits and protectionism impacting fair competition for the USA, or political, or security issues that are unresolved, he can, if he soo chooses weaponize Tariffs as a means of political leverage.[10]
• However, President Trump is not wrong as a world leader to identify weakness in the existing World Order and structures, that can undermine American power and security. American power was once the hegemon in IR, it turns out that it was a necessary option for long peace, its successes has meant some stability in international order, allowing for the growth of  globalisation that improved economics, in some cases the lives of people who were able to adapt to new states and market around the world from the late 1980s. Europe does need to provide a greater commitment to its own defence, to ensure continued stability and prosperity  in Europe – those relationships between the USA-EU have begun to change its reliance on the ‘special relationship’, which is changing and must change.
• The end of the war in the Ukraine may not result in desired outcomes, unless President Putin is challenged. It is very unlikely that US President Trump will continue to fund the war in Ukraine indefinitely –  there must be peace. His perceptions of the war in Europe are different from President Biden and further away from American realities of geo-politics. This new agenda, re-calibrating for Americans the stronger relationship with Western Europe, exposing it instead to Russia and China and North Korea – which are high on its great power political agenda. Is President Trump prepared to challenge China as well for Trade? Yes, but more gently. As it faces potential tensions over Taiwan.
• This behaviour risks a trade war with other nations, which coupled with great power status can be a dangerous mix.  Trade wars have historically led to armed conflict, or in a post-globalised geopolitical arena, now reflect forced tensions already in existence between nations; exacerbating, or adding to global instability in markets, but not necessarily armed conflict between the affected trading nations. There has been some turmoil in the global markets in March, which may signal a recession for several countries, including the USA and potentially those nations affected by US Tariffs.[11] Larger and increasing Tariffs will be unsustainable and the problems need to be resolved and contained. Government should look ahead and accommodate, with contingency, the likely impact on labour sectors accordingly, as existing markets may not be able to absorb job losses.
• The Western world, along with the rest of the World have relied on international institutions to resolve disputes on trade, and to adjudicate over human rights issues – such as at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Court of Justice  (ICC). If the American Administration under President Trump refuses, or any other nation blocks the normative arrangements in which the international order is stabilised, then justice cannot be adjudicated. Subsequently, alternative forms of diplomacy must be explored to help bring democratic measures back into the organisation. It is vital that these international organisations remain and can functionable now and in the future. WTO arrangements need to remain alive to issues and trade regimes must be updated through agreements, possibly at another ‘Doha Style Round’ and appointments to the Appellate Body must continue. Empowering institutions will enable states to work through new and difficult arrangements.[12]

America First – MAGA 2025, and the potential for Russian influence.

The American economy is more complex, breaking supply chains, forcing the global economy to restructure as the USA turns to protectionism, it will impact confidence in open markets and the US domestic economy as well will be affected. It will force a recessions as the US finds that it needs to restructure its economy over time to meet the demands of countries who are also in turn, going to be forced to do some restructuring, provide investments in jobs and skills, invest in equipment into new companies, or they will be forced to find alternative suppliers and partners in the global economy who are not the USA.

During his first Presidency, the Trump Administration was focused by policies directed by Peter Navarro and Wilbur Ross who believed that policies dictated by international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which promoted liberalisation of markets, were harming the US rather than helping less competitive areas of US manufacturing. ‘America First’ policies emerged which aimed to bring manufacturing back to the US, as this regime of liberalisation was benefiting other players in the system. It blocked the dispute settlement mechanism, which collapsed in 2019. The WTO had been seeking agreement on an updated regime, the inability of WTO members to agree a new regime ensured it collapsed, which has weakened the multilateral international trade system. No Top-Level Conference took place in 2020.[13]  

Deborah Elms discusses the importance of the staged tariffs imposed on China, and investigations seeking to find America’s rights to fairness in the system in Trade Disrupted: Global Tensions, US-China Trade War and COVID-19 Impact. Under President Trump, America withdrew from TPP, US Trade Representatives began to investigate China’s laws and trade, intellectual property and technology transfer in 2017. In 2018, it had found China guilty under Section 301, it subsequently began a truce in phases by publishing 4 lists of product lines in stages, attached with it varying tariffs of 10-25% between July 2018- May 2019. It was a novel way of dealing with the immediate perceived trade imbalance which it is argued impacted America’s growth. Deborah Elms details this showing China’s losses on goods in the billions of US dollars.[14] On return to the Presidency, President Trump has resumed to address the concerns of the American population on trade, he announced in January 2025, investigations aimed at Reviewing Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy.

US Trade Representatives (USTR) published policy papers on Supply Chain Resilience, use of rules of origin to promote resilience. And to investigate policy markets which enhance resilience. On return to Office for a second time, The Trump Administration announced on 24 January 2025, through USTR, a review of unfair Trade Practises, and also came to an agreement on Mexican GM corns in foods, and agricultural animal feed on 6 February 2025. Disputes were settled under the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). This month USTR also published A Trade Policy Agenda and launched another Section 301 investigation into China’s acts, policies and practises related to the dominance of semiconductor industry.[15] The US uses bilateral agreements to manage specific disputes, therefore it has practically opted out of the WTO resolution mechanisms. But it may see a longer-term and reasonable benefit in engaging and unblocking WTO arrangements.

This current position may be a continuity of the ‘trade-war between China and the US’, which was started under the last Trump Presidency.  Deborah Elms perceived then, “Trumps own focus on trade deficits as a measure of health and wellbeing… According to the White House, China had made purchasing commitments of US $200bn in a range of goods across two-year time frame, these purchases were meant to encompass agricultural products like soya beans, as well as energy products, manufacturing goods and services. Chinese purchases would have the effect of recovering a long-stranding trade deficit with China”.[16]

These ideas have not been fully tested, and although the US always won at the WTO, there are some economic academics amongst the Chinese University, at Hong Kong University, that perceive that it would be possible for China to be independent, like the USA as it seeks a ‘balanced trade’ in the global economy. Potentially raising it above the institutional framework of the WTO. China is by far the greater exporter of US goods and services as a percentage of GDP of the two nations, its value added to GDP is just less than double at 11.2%, and the US 6.8% (2019 figures) .[17] What is known is that tariffs can cause disruption to Asian markets in Korea and aspects of Japanese markets that supply China, this was the case in 2017-2019, but new Tariffs will always affect the countries which form part of the supply chain. However, it also provided opportunities for countries affected to make new trade agreements from within Asia, with Chile, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore – new Digital Economy Agreements.[18] What ‘degrees of decoupling’, will take place between the two nations, has yet to take place under in this Administration and could be very disruptive.

Institutional perspectives are complex, and the balance sheet under another Administration can appear quite different, once the rules set by the WTO are followed. In 2021 the Biden Administration then announced engagement into reform of the WTO, to assure the integrity of the multilateral institution, and to fix the failings it experienced. America wished to reengage and to aid reforms it had to date been the most active in using the dispute mechanisms. ‘President Obama had issued 25 complaints to the Appellate Body alone’, we are reminded. The WTO needed new judges to the Appellate Body, but this process was blocked by President Trump in making new appointments in 2019 and then President Biden also maintained the block, there were furthermore challenges on the interpretation of international trade law and a desire to change how the body interpreted cases. It remains suspended and in crisis. “The Appellate Body routinely issued rulings that made it harder for states to combat unfair trade practices and safeguard jobs,” (former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer).[19] But a new Director General was appointed in 2021 and no resolution was found. The same argument applies today, that a renewed commitment to WTO principles is vital for global trade and that the regime must be sustained and renewed. President Biden had heralded commitment to the WTO, whilst European countries sought a two-tier dispute settlement system.[20] The system under the WTO appeared to be failing, soo much soo, that some commentators argued that the Washington Consensus was over and that US Tariffs were here to stay, talk of deglobalisation and deindustrialisation had brought along with it a desire to reform it, the WTO went into crisis. There was a push for a new paradigm in 2023/24 should President Biden be re-elected, one which would enable the USA to continue to engage and move towards an agreed global trade picture with European nations.[21]

One option is to pay the premium, but that would break otherwise medium or smaller emerging performing economies over time, coupled with rising costs of inflation followed predictably by recession, creating what we already know to be cycles of poverty and asset grabbing by economic elites –  restructuring society. America will want to pursue a different option to Russia which has been a WTO member since 2012, and the USA will not leave the WTO regime in the long term. Russia experienced this form of illiberal captured economic arrangements from after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, failing to democratise by Western Standards in the early 2000s, but opening markets to foreign companies and especially popular retail brands to work from within Russia. Russian Civil Society had grown strong over ten years from 2000 and civil society was curious about democracy.

President Putin took the Russian nation in a different direction, away from any hopes of democratic reforms, instead creating a hybrid of institutions, restricting politics and the economy, to give power to oligarchy, rewarding the same individuals, similar to ‘a management chain’,  for their contribution to the Russian state, which is characterised by Putin and nationalism, described today as neofascism.[22] This is a form of authoritarian behaviour which can be found elsewhere, and which is described by poor regulation, and is free from independent thinking and largely prone to authoritarian influence. State institutions are not impartial. This has weakened Civil Society and independence of the media, journalism and the arts. It is not a democracy, despite Western aspirations for President Putin’s Russia to join the democratic states through the UN, and inclusion in Wilsonian Institutions, Russia has decided to make its own way  over a period of twenty years. Today it is recognisably Russia rejecting ‘external influence in society’, by controlling its media, arts, sports cultures and construction, it has seen reasonable protection of its currency, and it has developed wide trading arrangements with Western nations.

Today it trades vast amounts of oil, fertilizer (across Europe and the UK) and Russian goods like vodka across the former Soviet Union, or Slavic States, who share a similar language – Russia shares also its cultural goods.  It has been the initial silent threats posed by Russia to its now democratised European neighbours, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Lithuania, which had been contained until the 2010s, that has continued to raise tension and now the verbal threats through Russian state media continue to raise  levels of risk described and reported in European media daily. The first war in Ukraine in 2014 sparked further tensions as Crimea is effectively annexed to Russia, and activity around boarders of Yugoslavia and Montenegro experience moments of Russian influence and threats to stability by proxy.

This large Bear of a nation appears to offer an alternative source of power to others – aiding the idea that the West is receding or dying – Russia has tried to convince nations through BRICs and diplomacy that it can offer a ‘balance of power’ in the world to the USA and therefore stability – the Cold War, provided some assurance against nuclear annihilation for instance, but Russian influence was felt worldwide.  I disagree that it can be an alternative great power again, in the long-term, Russia cannot offer enough to the world and global civil society to assume that position for the long term. The continued second war in Ukraine 2022, has shown Western Alliances have resilience, historic experience of diplomacy and the means to enable military aid, and support for the protection for sovereign statehood of another country, such as Ukraine.

This has been the case for over three years with the support of another Western nation the USA. Ukrainians share Western values and hope to join the EU and NATO going forward.  It had the support from the Biden Administration for five years until December 2024. Presidents are replaced, but public opinion does not shift soo dramatically without some cause or imbalance elsewhere in the system, and President Trump will face opposition from within the Republican Party and The Senate and The House of Representatives. US public opinion could be split over time, on the outcomes of the MAGA policies, and the impact of tariffs on the US economy. Especially if he is acting to appease President Putin.  Americans are a proud people.

One fourth point, which marks this US President out, is his use of power in international relations, it is dramatic and forceful. President Trump is a businessman of the 1980’s and influenced by the culture and values of that time. His style of Presidency is not traditional American politics, he is new to American politics in that way, and he does not come from a technical government, or legal background which would aid a President as he steers a new American Government – instead he has chosen to shape Government according to his style of Presidency – disturbing institutions, including Judges as he has signed a wave of executive orders intended to attack, curtail and change governments and aspects of society, for the purpose of leverage. You could say that he has been restrained, but there are  questions of concern raised by some opinion makers as to how far an ‘authoritative’ figure or personality in world politics the President could become or should be allowed to become. Others will argue that he is provocative, but that he is doing his job as President under the mandate given to him by the American people.

But there is one stark reality, even if some of the World  Leaders dislike the President and his policies and approach to world politics, he has raised issues of ‘fair trade’ for America, crime and migration through porous borders, the need to end the wars in both Gaza and Ukraine, by the cutting of political or military aid and financial support for Ukraine. It echoes the honest and innocent concerns of many of his voters.  It is true that wars cannot continue without money, and he has chosen to use the power of the USA to end them. He has also raised the obvious issue of points of weakness in European defence – including the accusation of European nations ‘freeloading’ on security through US dependence commitments to NATO which are larger amongst wealthy nations. Europe is reliant on continued US financial support, and it is not up to its full potential yet.

He has however made accusations, used misinformation, propaganda about Ukraine, which is untrue, or he has used it in a way intended to provoke. As he develops his Presidency the American public can choose to understand the President, the idea that he and the public have been subject to misinformation himself/themselves – lends weight to his character as an incumbent President; but at the same time one that has already been impeached, and he was convicted for crimes, but has become immune from being deselected to become President for a second time. This must challenge the norms and values of traditional America as well. This outcome has created a dangerous toolkit of opinions and flexibility – a mix of options which suggests that the Western World should not expect stability or predictability under President Trump, as he settles into Office.

One accepted norm in IR was that the US retained its seat at the Top Table of Power because it was able to financially support European Security, in return it has access to shared intelligence and other fast forms of information for the purpose of American defence and Security under Treaty. This may also reveal our need for US intelligence. Although this sharing has become a norm, it is also the case that the US has gained information about other nations and allies. It is not wrong to try and calibrate arrangements that are contrary or are no longer useful in a changing situation which requires flexibility for the US, but in turn European countries and Allies must strengthen their own. Use of Five Eyes for Instance and use of Intelligence Agencies may weaken or compromise state interest as the current position is one which disagrees with President Trump on policies affecting geopolitical security.

The President’s message is clear, if Europe wishes to continue a war, there are consequences of doing so. If it wishes to win a war, on values, liberalism, Western European identity, it must invest, reorganise, reaffirm commitments in defence with real outcomes. In response you would expect ‘a coalition of the  willing and boots on the ground and new equipment through investment’. These cannot just be words – expectations are strengthened allegiances and alliances, and its diplomatic relationships within Europe, amongst allies and through existing allegiances to explore what must be done. This in real terms means financial commitments and the support of the USA European nations and Britain argues, must be on board.

The alternative is more Russian influence on states, which are in contradiction to their actual Western European interests – rather then forced or blurred identity and interests based on circumstance rather than empowerment. There is evidence of some commitment to explore what needs to be done already and commitments to defence spending.  It cannot, however, be battle against President Putin without the support of the leading democracy, the USA – ‘a backstop and a Security’ guarantee – there can be no more backsliding on polices towards Europe, without significant consequences, for the world. No one wants to experience another  World War II.

If warm relations between Russia and the USA gives strength to Great Power politics and Spheres of Influence, dynamics in the global system, expect to see public dialogue,  as a consequence, an influence in world politics and realignments of states across the World. But this is a choice that Western Europe is free to make,  choosing to protect those former Soviet State which chose democracy some decades ago and joined the EU under Treaty. Europe has disagreed with President Trump already on the power status of Russia which it is rejecting, and it is choosing to become less dependent on the USA for security reasons. The US President is seeking to readdress ‘actual global economic balance’, and ‘trade deficits’ with the USA, to ensure what America receives a ‘fair deal’.

 This logic or rational approach perceives Europe as a needing to fills in gaps in what America sees as less productive, or economically ready parts of Europe for future trade – Ukraine is its weakest example along with a potential shortlist of unspoken other countries. The USA must avoid capture of political narrative by Russia, and it must produce its own narrative about the ‘peace deal’ it would like, without influence or coercion from Russia. A weakened USA in power and in diplomatic terms would be disastrous for the world. It has already enabled Russia to regain parts of Ukraine lost and areas from within Russia under Ukrainian control.

Psychologically European states need to understand what American diplomats and economists are saying about their economies, not just the rhetoric, where it needs help and what it needs from Europe. But the USA is saying that NATO needs Europe to be less reliant on US funding, it has shown that it can distance itself from European Security issues before, but at the same time, that its commitment to NATO and Article 5 is ‘iron clad’ as stated by a US NATO representative, in February an ‘attack on one is an attack on all’. However, analysts at the European Centre for Analysis, indicate that there is no obligation or legal requirement on the USA to engage troops under Article 5 if NATO borders are breached – it has a choice when to do so, and whether to do so. How President Trump will manage his own thoughts about NATO is a different matter.

Europe is also wary of the real prospect of further Russification, or Russian Imperialism, in parts of Europe, if relations between Russia and the USA are warmed too much and the potential disruption in Northern Europe caused, is not comfortable nor welcome. Sweden, Norway and Denmark are already aligned to protect those borders and Seas with Russia.   These countries do not want Russian proxies, influence or destabilising activities within their states – Europe may have to stand alone not just over Ukraine (but unified under 27 states which includes the UK amongst European defence states). This is something being explored by European Leaders now.

President Trump’s impact on Global Diplomacy (evidence sources broadcast)

President Trump has created, through diplomatic meetings, various moments of diplomatic history in public, which give rise to concerns about intentions in the following areas:

1. Prior to his winning the Election President Trump had declared that he would find a way to end the war in Ukraine, and “that it should never had happened if he had been President at the time”, he holds a similar opinion on Gaza. On 23 January he declared that he was ready to meet President Putin, the discussions aimed at Great Power politics such as nuclear deterrence and descaling of nuclear weapons amongst the great three powers China, Russia and the USA. He did not include European nations in this framework for discussion or other nations with nuclear deterrent.  (Escalating Russian nuclear threats and those of North Korea are of concern on a global platform to all nations).
2. This suggests that US diplomacy between Russia is possible, as the President continues the desire to end the war peacefully. This initially seemed destabilising to Ukraine and indicates a dramatic change to the rest of the World, along with other statements about unresolved problems, which have since been addressed, on the Mexican border and on crime and immigration. Claudia Sheinbaum of Mexico  intervened and seems to have resolved the immediacy of the issues. Both nations have interdependency in automobile and other goods supply chains. The US also has an interdependence with Canada for trade and his Administration needs to explain threats of annexation – ‘making Canada the 51^st State’ under directed at Prime Minister Trudeau. The new Prime Minister of Canada, Mark Carney(appointed on 14 March 2025), will need to manage relations with the US closely to ensure along with other nations, the need to steer discussion that are constructive and assure peace, and economic stability and maintained sovereignty for Canada, as part of the British Commonwealth, should they wish to remain.

The USA and its neighbours in the Americas

1. Accusations about the Panama Canal suffering from trade influence and monopoly from Chinese firms in January and Panama being unable to manage those affairs on its own, is another example of rhetoric. These claims were refuted by both Panama and China. Canada and the Greenland now may claim rhetorical threats of annexation by the USA, whilst Canada and Mexico began to experience a trade war at midnight on 4 March 2025. Tensions with Colombia were also raised slightly over the deportation of migrants in January 2025, but this nation has become a worthy cautious silent ally to the West over time, addressing policy concerns – despite Presidential differences in opinions amongst other nations in Latin Americas. President Trump is also unkeen  on escalating tensions and the US Administration has suggested a shift in geopolitical alliances by forceful trade shifts in policy. Attempted changes also to the name of the Gulf of Mexico, raise issues about sovereignty and ‘international law of the sea known as maritime law’. Fear of an unknown future is causing change in what is Western Democracy and Regions of Western Alliances. Further considerations should be given to what may happen in the Americas, as Tariffs begin to settle on Mexico, can old Treaties and Agreements continue to resolve trade issues? It is hoped that with renewed diplomacy and through international institutions, such as the WTO these matters can be negotiated. The alternative could be exhausting and resources intensive to nations who continue to have to bilaterally resolve daily trade disputes.

US and Russian relations

1. Warm US and Russian relationships would be destabilising to the international order. The world familiar with President Biden has been brought to an end, but there are new beginnings which are positive for European powers. However, this new developing power framework in International Relations requires Russia in negotiations to achieve peace, it requires diplomacy at some phase. There are going to be issues of trust, especially when it involves Russia. From experience, Europe and the World has experienced some historical Russian imperialism and aggression, but that is not at full strength and if exercised to full capacity, it will result in World War III. Europe is being asked to make concessions, which it is not willing to make, but that decision on concessions was led by President Trump in January, without convincing European powers of the need to do soo. His weakness in this new international paradigm is that he risks exposing America. There are blurred lines of morality in this approach, this may be his natural Presidential limit in personal character, and power – due also to his grassroot support, he will need to act without compromising the US Government, all its institutions, traditions and its future security to retain their support.  It is after all only the American people who can empower the President.

Specific evidence of a deepening and changing approach to US international geopolitics

• President Trump received a phone call on 12 February 2025, from President Putin congratulating him on his appointment to Office at the White House. European Leaders met in Paris to discuss the situation of Ukraine on 17 February 2025. The UK is looking for a ‘backstop commitment’ from the USA on Peace in Ukraine. This meeting was an opportunity for European powers to discuss a European Peace Deal, and for Pete Hegseth the US Secretary for Defence to give his message on US European Defence commitments which impact Ukraine. His message was direct and clear, signalling a different direction on global Security matters; that Europe must increase its defence spending in relation to NATO and expect it to be less reliant on the USA in future, which it perceives as ‘free riding’ on defence spending, especially with regards to Ukraine.
• This statement reflects increasing pressure in the Indo-Pacific, since before the US Election, and tensions rising –with China before his inauguration. This suggests that the President may wish to realign and restructure the current World Order, for reasons of US Security, a new world order to enable the USA to access, leverage and use its full power in the world, as a leader of US Democracy. What President Trump is seeking in ‘old realpolitik’  an advantage over the Order by ‘carrot or stick’, it is one point of view and in his search for ‘fairness towards America’. More cynical analysis is that he is also potentially seeking a power grab – he now needs to use such power wisely in international relations and at home, to retain and develop good relationships with other states.

US relations towards European Security (NATO)

• Over the course of some weeks, this new reordering has been accepted as the direction of International Relations which has changed old ties and now both the UK, and Denmark have pledged between 2.5% of GDP on Defence and 3%, with Statements in the UK Parliament at the end of February, whilst Italy also indicated a renewed commitment to state defence spending.  In France, President Macron will continue to help support Ukraine. This French security guarantee may not displease the French Military leaders who have a prominent political position from the right of French politics, who have argued for a stronger French military defence, so may be a welcome decision amongst a certain group of French voters.  Germany’s Chancellor Merz has also indicated that Europe should be less dependent on the United States. The message has begun to develop, that Europe will need to provide its own Collective European Defence Force, should the USA decide to pull out, or reduce its commitments to NATO – if it were attacked by Russia (in the case of Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Poland are all affected), it would need to defend itself, or face the consequences of Russian expansion. US commitment to NATO was affirmed in relation to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty by US representatives to NATO in late February. However, by March Edward Lucas from the Centre of European Analysis suggested that NATO may not exist in future, as the US removes itself from its responsibilities to NATO. It may be that there will be a European Defence Alliance in the future. There would, however, need to be a formal decoupling from NATO, that has not happened, nor are there commitments to do so.

A UK-EU (NATO) dynamics in diplomacy

• A comparative analysis of Article 5 and Article 42(7), published by the European Parliament highlights the confusion around obligations under Article 5, agreed in the 1948 Washington Treaty “The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an attack occurs, each of them in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence by Article 51, of the Charter of the UN will assist the Party of Parties, so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary”. In 1948-9 the peace negotiated relied on immediate response after World War II and was based on the Agreement between nations. Historically the US feared being automatically drawn into a war in Europe and the wording was such to accepted but does not imply that there is US automatic involvement, this was strengthened by Article 11.
• A progressive change was introduced sixty years later in Article 42(7) “If a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation” (European Parliament Note 2022). Article 42 (7) was first invoked in 2015 after attacks in Paris, its invocation was described as political, but legal interpretation of the EU High Representative indicated that no further formal formality was required to provide assistance. Bilateral discussion became inevitable between France and other nations.[1]   Assistance also consisted in assistance for airstrikes on anti-ISIS operations in Syria and Iraq.[2] Article 5 had already been invoked after 9/11, in 2001 as attacks had been directed from abroad and from Afghanistan. The view has been to that these Articles must be operational in the long run.
• More interestingly as the UK remains part of the Treaty, PM Kier Starmer and Putin’s Russia became a threat to stability in the UK before 2017, it is clearly outlined that countries would provide troops for peace keeping, there is no public discussion on whether the UN should be engaged, or whether European countries should seek a resolution first through the UN, irrespective of the fact that both the US and Russia may veto a Peace Keeping force. NATO Treaty however can be invoked, as part of a set of instruments created after the 1945 settlement. European military commanders have been in discussions as to how to proceed. Whether the legality of all these agreements around a European Defence Peace Keeping Force are ready to be tested, requires consideration.  However, if nations are attacked it is likely that they will take actions due to the rules of international security and defence. President Putin has already pointed out that using NATO troops would be unacceptable to Russia. His threats to Europe have continued, therefore a ‘nuclear umbrella’ for Europe is also an idea being presented as a solution to regime change, creating realigned stability and a way forward for a Security framework and a stabilised World Order – a proportioned solution for Europe.
• This could be a European ‘backstop’ solution should Russia at any stage decide to invade another NATO nation. European leaders have reiterated this cannot happen without the USA’s support and that there remains a need for some contribution by the US towards a collective security paradigm. Europe is now forced to provide for its own defence security regime (either inside or outside of NATO-raising questions about a collective defence fund). But the continuing expansion of NATO, Russia has warned, will result in further threats of action and the potential use of nuclear weapons. France and the UK are also nuclear powers, and so a realignment of powers in Europe could result in a ‘power balance’ in Europe, sufficient to ward off a threat from Russia, but not without the USA.

1. In early March 2025 both France and Britain made statements, that they were prepared to commit ‘troops on the ground’, but there is no statement about deployment and commitments on action are guarded by a request for  safeguards and guarantees and the need to invest in the British Armed Forces (this takes time). They are also prepared to put Typhoon planes in the sky for the purpose of peacekeeping over Ukraine. This verbal commitment from both President Macron and Prime Minister Starmer will require more deployment, although Northern Europe such as Finland, is already geared to protect its own borders between Russia, it has said it will do soo, but it also expects some US Security Guarantees. Those given at NATO by US representatives earlier this year, may echo an informal guarantee.  However, the withdrawal of US military aid to Ukraine and intelligence from 4 March, could have meant a signalled rapid end to the war, but to what end is unclear. It has since been restored.

• The UK has not yet invested an increase in 2.5% of GDP in UK defence infrastructure, and details will arise from the Spring Defence Strategic Review in 2025. Norway, Finland and Sweden have an informal alliance due to geopolitics and borders; they are discussing a more Formal New Cooperation Structure arrangement for the High North, leaving behind The Barents Agreement. (On a historical note, all three nations had been part of a greater United Kingdom in the North until 1905). Their commitments have resulted in a visible volunteer defence army. Their agenda and interest in security in this area of Europe is already a real response and founded on real concerns and a natural reaction to security threats to sovereignty in the region (following the invasion of Ukraine and historic disputes). Russia has been warning Europe since 2022, that it is likely to respond to continuing acts which constitute a threat to its intended expansion, which it describes as Russian rights.
• The USA has also voted twice over two months in the UN against Allies and against the Ukraine on related Resolutions about the need to ensure its continued defence. And to reinstate Ukrainian State Sovereignty.  Instead, the USA proposed an amendment or softening of the statements about the sovereignty of the Ukraine.  This is a shift from previous US policy. And European nations should expect a change in voting support on Ukraine from the President and his Representative Official at the UN, reflecting current American policies towards Ukraine. He is seeking lasting peace with Russia, but how and what are those concessions – and are they in Western Europe’s interests? It will take a lot of work to convince the President otherwise, but it is necessary.

Visible and increasing European Leadership in Diplomacy

• Continued military support for Ukraine from the USA is weakening, by refusing membership of Ukraine in NATO President Trump has outlined his case against Ukraine, who he considers to be a ‘brave nation’, but not as important a threat as China economically or politically significant as Russia. A more unstable Europe at war, may be perceived as a greater threat to America, and this reaction from President Trump is a form of containment towards likely overspill in a wider war in the Region. But he has been realistic, he has convinced the US public that Europe has been ‘free riding’ on defence and must do more to support itself in Security matters.
• These issues have been largely accepted, and diplomatic moments in February suggest i) an adjusted united European position to this first few months, through a commitment to continued Western support for Ukraine (this is the case aside from Hungary). Ii) The US Presidents’ early telephone calls in January with President Putin and subsequent meetings with him in Saudi Arabia, on 17 February 2025, suggest that he appreciates his relationship with the President of Russia and that these relationships could become warmer. Iii)  US sanctions against Russia continue, but these could decrease as the relationship moves on. Iv) President Trump has made it clear to both leaders of Russia and Ukraine that he wanted to make a Peace Deal on Ukraine, implying that US aid and military money for Ukraine could cease.  In March this has meant a withdrawal of shared American intelligence with Ukraine and any military aid going forward, which has been vital for Ukraine in its war with Russia.  V) Immediate withdrawal of US intelligence information, through Five Eyes, and other Agencies, now means that Ukraine is not able to be as agile in their continued military operations.  Star Link satellite contracts owned by Elon Musk now Head of the US Presidents’ DOGE Department for efficiency, it could be used as political leverage, but it would conflict with existing contracts with Ukraine. If it is considered by the US Administration, that this communication support for war effort should end as well then, this war will close sooner than Ukraine may currently expect to the advantage of Russia.
• President Trump has been irritated by some of Presidents Zelenskyy’s unmovable positions on territory such as Crimea and the Donbas, since then and his views on Russia, in return the President of Ukraine has offered to exchange his Presidency for Ukrainian membership of NATO.  This is also an offer, of diplomacy, if it is his personal view that his continued Presidency is impacting the relationship with the USA and Ukraine moving forward. He is prepared to go, even though polls show that the Ukrainian voting public still trust him, but in exchange for acceptance of Ukraine within an Alliance Defence Force (NATO) that includes the USA. The  political aim of President Trump is to end the war – which he sees as costly in terms of human life and money. He has tested Ukraine’s desire to end the war itself. Some European powers disagree that President Trump should have any capacity to determine when that war should end, by the norms and standards of international relations, neither nation is wrong, although Russia breached international law in its invasion of Ukraine. These differences can now only be resolved through diplomacy. America feels it has the right to intervene given its financial backing of the war between $180bn-$350bn dollars and it cannot continue to back the war. (It is estimated that it is closer to $180bn).
• Presidential desires for money to be returned from investments in the Ukraine war to the USA through some means, such as  a rare Mineral Agreement Deal which would provide the USA access to Ukrainian mineral reserves, as part of a Deal towards Peace – the details of which have not been published or agreed through International Treaty or Agreement – lack recognisable traditional ‘real politik’ around a new cold war arrangement or a European settlement solution status. The deal in this sense was not ready in February, or there could be a separate Peace Settlement and package developing – it must involve details about territory ceded, borders and security dimensions, then reconstruction details and how a financial settlement should take place to reconstruct Ukraine. These events normally follow a sequence. The President wished to sign this deal before, offering any Security Guarantees, which would be an assurance to European states, ready and willing to defend Ukraine behind the front line. 

The USA and its Allies going forward

• The USA has led forces with the support of the UK and other European Allies in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last 20 years. Allied countries have fought alongside the USA and have experience fighting on the ground.  Individual states may not have the resources and personnel alone, but a unified Europe with a defence and nuclear capacity, is a real policy option being tested amongst European states right now. Note that it is now the way in which other nations are responding to the Trump Administration, that some resolutions are being obtained through world power moves in Europe and elsewhere.

Example : The Finish President has suggested that if during a Peace Settlement, Ukraine is attacked again, that a settlement should be caveated with the option for European defence of Ukraine. The ‘Great Power’ alignments being created must recognise this now as possible way forward.

• States must protect their intelligence, as their policies and interest change, some nations may feel that it is no longer viable to share intelligence and may not be in an individual states interest to do so in the future. Five Eyes (US, Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand), has been a shared operation, but as the US Administration has changed its purpose and the Agreements underpinning shared intelligence will likely be reviewed with regards to sensitive intelligence information. Australia has already voiced some concerns about points of disagreement. How quickly intelligence information should stop circulating amongst certain nations, whilst supporting Ukraine for as long as it is possible – within the current frameworks. The UK  raised some similar operational concerns during the UK House of Commons Defence Committee Hearing on 4 March, “The European Contribution to European Security”. AUKUS Agreement – which constitutes an Australian Defence Agreement as well, will also be of concern to Australia. Despite having received reassurances from the US Secretary of State for Defence on 24 February, recognising the significance of the need for defence industry in the Region, Heads of States are nervous.  The strategic purpose of AUKUS may have changed for President Trump. What will happen to the handover of Virginia class nuclear defence fleet submarines to Australia? Strategically this was to be a means of strengthening security in the region, with America recognising the significance of containment of activity and threats in the Indo-Pacific – it sought a balance of power.
• Diplomatic discussion took place in Washington, on 24 February between President Macron of France and President Trump of the USA, both demonstrated soft diplomacy in their open discussions with one another and this meeting was followed by a  successful  media meeting. Then within a few days, on 27 February, there was a meeting between the UK PM Kier Starmer and President Trump who met and then provided a public media conference.  Both visits can be described as diplomatically successful, under what could have been very tricky circumstances.  This was done, simultaneously whilst France and the UK  revive and repledge their commitment to Ukraine by providing payments in the forms of loans and military war aid. In an act of Public Diplomacy. President Trump also received an invitation by King Charles, for an Official State Visit to the UK, an unprecedented Offer, from Canada’s Head of State, a nation threatened by annexation from the USA. It was warmly received. This was a well-choreographed display of diplomacy.

What can go ‘wrong’ or ‘right’, depending on a Leaders point of view

• There was a much less successful diplomatic meeting between President Zelensky and  President Trump the following day, with a public outburst from both Presidents in front of US state media. President Trump was later accused of creating a diplomatic trap for President Zelensky to force him to sign a rare minerals peace deal, as recompense for the US’s commitments given to the war thus far.  Reasonably it was too soon in negotiations to do so. The background to this meeting, having been the discussion between President Trump and President Putin, where he had expressed the idea of concessions in discussion about the future for Ukraine and ending the war.
• This took place despite the heavy sanctions on Russia already, and then controversially having determined already to offer Ukrainian territory to Russia, by claiming Ukraine would not receive lands annexed in Crimea and other areas captured since the second war in Ukraine. The perception was that the US President had already indirectly given too many concessions to Russia before the meeting in Saudia Arabia, which Ukraine was not ready to give. Preceding this meeting the US President had blamed President Zelensky for the invasion of Ukraine, and had stated that he would inevitably have to give up  Crimea and Russian held territory; blaming President Zelensky for his continued fight for territory which he claims should not have been an issue in the first place (in light of it being a Russian annexation). Ukrainian is a sovereign state which had been under occupation and rule by Russia during an Imperialist Age. This invasion of Crimea was  in breach of international law, but is also a historical  reoccurrence.

Some work towards a Peace Settlement for Ukraine has begun

• Since that meeting on 4 March, the President of the USA received a letter from President Zelenskyy, following Ukrainian public diplomatic statements and effective written public statements that he was once again ready for a discussion on Peace and to sign a minerals deal, which would reduce America’s reliance on China on rare metals for manufacturing.  This paved the way for negotiations, and possibly a deal which Ukraine can live with,  in the future, as it adjusts to the idea that war is coming to an end, as financial support for the war decreases. The number of Russian losses and wounded soldiers may be close to 800,000-900,000 (figures will need to be confirmed by independent Agencies and the UN). Ukraine is severely damaged, and it will need a ‘reconstruction package’, along with a peace settlement, it has military aid from Europe and financing in the forms of loans, which could be converted for the purpose of peace keeping or reconstruction.
• The USA is said to have provided at least 49% of the war funding Ukraine received. There would need to be assurances that Russia could not later use these Ukrainian funds, if it were to fall to occupation, or for it to be ring-fenced as a settlement which Europe would be content with (loans, trade deals and military assistance/security deals, even confiscated Russian assets worth billions). One option is a Peace Settlement going forward that could be agreed, amongst a group of European nations, rather than between Russia and the USA. Given the starts and pauses to US financial commitment to the war since January 2025, it is hard to see a permanent financial US commitment, in defence of Ukraine. But it would be unlikely to hold without the US supporting it publicly.
• The UK and European Powers have already begun to reorganise and organise diplomatic Summits outside of the UN and NATO.  These meetings include the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (since 26 April 2022), which has been meeting regularly  and includes 57 allies and 25 other nations. Meetings were organised to date by the US Administration (largely to discuss the outcomes of the US donations of military aid to Ukraine). But more recently, this meeting was  instead organised by the UK on 25 February, suggesting that this is a permanent change in tone and direction on US policy towards Ukraine. More recently the European Summit hosted in London on 2 March, its size and prominence indicated that these discussions were a noteworthy diplomatic event for European Leaders, for the purpose defence and security.
• The PM Kier Starmer has also described a ‘coalition of the willing’ to defend Ukraine from Russia, but it is only framed as a Peace Keeping Force, normally a UN lead force. The US Vice President Vance already perceives this possible Coalition to be ‘too weak’ to sustain a peace and will not provide a Security Guarantee for Ukraine. European Leaders are working towards a recognisable ‘Collective Security’, a term used in international relations to describe old European Ties, evoking pre-world war moments of large multilateral European diplomacy in the style  envisioned and documented by the ‘European Frankfurt School’ and ‘English School’ of international relations, where  values and principles about Western Democracy and its survival are largely shared values.  Europe will have to iron out old tensions, negotiate Defence Funds, and ‘who’ can be part of a New European Security Framework once again. Today that discussion involves national defence contractors and ‘who’ will contribute what over time, but there must be an overarching Principled Framework.
• From an American perspective, ending a war which could escalate further with Russia, is a primary objective for this American President. Therefore, decisive action had to be taken.  This has been the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s stance. A ‘back stop agreement’ may involve the UK housing US nuclear weapons for instance, but that has not been agreed by the US, and it had been rejected in March. If it empowers European Defence, this may not be a compromise on UK soil, unless the ‘backstop comes’ with too many concessions to President Putin as well. The Ukrainian front will collapse without US support, although it has some months to go with military aid committed by European States this month including Denmark, Germany and Poland. A freeze on military aid from the USA to Ukraine, may mean that President Zelensky’s position will become untenable and that the war will come to an end.
• Under Russian annexation, former Soviet countries such as Ukraine and their leaders will be at risk from Russian courts, and influence.  Therefore, there is a greater need for Europe to defend itself if future Russian expansion occurs within the expected 10-year period. Europe must be prepared to defend itself.

Other international pressures

• On Gaza, the US and Britain also differs in an approach to a peace deal, with the Foreign Secretary David Lammy seeking a two-state solution, a favoured position by the UN. President Trump is instead offering contentious concessions to Israel and to PM Netanyahu’s Cabinet and right-wing coalition, by proposing a transfer of the total Palestinian population of Gaza into Arab territories. A proposal rejected following diplomatic meetings with the Head of State of Jordan in January 2025 and diplomatic discussions with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Trump Administration said that they perceive these nations to have the capacity to rehouse and home 1.9m Palestinians permanently without eligibility to return to Gaza. The proposal to turn Gaza into a different kind of destination for tourism, has shocked and offended people, and has likely caused some offence to its Middle Eastern neighbour and unsettled Israelis – as this is not a shared nor agreed vision for reconstruction by either nation. The current ceasefire continues to hold in parts. Both the populations continue to feel under threat and are continuing with armed tensions and attacks.  Several Arab nations have put forward alternative reconstruction plans in March; these are likely not to be ignored and reflect investment plans for a two-state solution.
• The realities that the Palestinian population has at times little access to humanitarian aid and does not want to leave its territory, is a real threat to the current Israeli government and the right-wing political status quo in Isreal. The immediate need it was argued, by Marco Rubio Secretary of State and President Trump, is to stop the war and to save the lives of Palestinians who remain, the only guarantee to achieve that, the US administration it perceives, is their removal.  Logically the desire to remove people to safety makes sense, but the power of statehood has been underestimated and the desire to remain on Palestinian land appears to be stronger than the threats administered by IDF Forces, even though the likelihood of further settlements by non-Palestinians on their land is now likely be higher than ever.  Some Palestinians have begun to ask Hamas to leave, as it is failing to bring peace. By US assessment Gaza is uninhabitable, for daily life; the running of local government, schools, hospitals and markets and Gazans logically need somewhere safe to live. This issue is going to continue to take up time at the White House, but the President is determined to write history in a different way. President Trump may find that many other people disagree on rewriting Western European history and agency, but there is a great desire to work with him if he is able to accommodate different opinions.

Tariffs and Political Economy

Retaliatory tariffs of the kind which will be experienced by Canada, Mexico and China will result in increasing inflation; it impacts spending, jobs, employment, restructuring supply chains, it is expensive. These consequences will also be felt in the USA, with food and drinks, automobile, agricultural products, clothing and car production likely to be most affected.  This will affect American farmers, retailers and consumer goods producers, as costs to producers are absorbed in what would be salaries, financing for company growth and manufacturing, and retail expansion.  What shrinkage of the American Economy and that of those countries affected by Tariffs, will be, is difficult to predict today, but oil production could increase in response to Tariffs to lower prices (there is some evidence of this strategy already), and mining production my reach a higher limit, although Aluminium and Steel mining will initially benefit from US protectionism, as America ramps up production of its own manufacturing, including, within its own defence industries, there will be a natural optimum growth. 

America also needs to reduce its dependence on Chinese rare minerals known as rare metals such as Lithium and it has begun negotiations with Ukraine instead. President Zelenskyy confirmed by 4 March 2025, that he was ready to give access to rare metals as part of a Peace Deal for Ukraine and that access was assured by a desire to agree Peace in Ukraine, with American support. The Proposed US Tariff on certain countries and their products are outlined below. The impact of these tariffs is now being assessed, as supply chains in Car manufacturing across Canada and Mexico are complex and affect a few countries as automobile parts are made world-wide. Some impact analysis has been published by international data Organisations and companies such as Stata, governments and State Statistical services and localised Business and Economic Agencies will need to publish data, as Tariffs are implemented  and begin to impact sectors and markets from 1 April 2025.

The US Tariff lists include Canada – 25%,  Mexico – 25 % the UK – 10%, the EU – 25% and China – 10%, on selected products imported into the USA. Analysis is being undertaken to begin to examine how those Tariffs may impact jobs, restructuring across national borders and supply chains, and production. And how those Tariffs may result in the structuring of global trade, without dispute resolutions mechanisms available to nations at the WTO.

Mediation on world trade Tariff disputes are for the World Trade Organisation (WTO), but since the appointment of judges to the Appellate Body have been blocked by the USA, that democratic process, and the dispute settlement process has been weakened considerably, reducing disputes to political negotiations which can be leveraged for political purposes. This leaves developing and emerging nations to more unscrupulous arrangements, which are not independently heard, or resolved. This is now a world with less rule of law, weakening international organisations which must shield the most vulnerable states.  These arrangements can now be leveraged and exploited, for trade and resources by some of the wealthiest nations, unless democracy and equity are restored in relations. Tariffs make this a more aggressive process open to power politics, rather than rational arrangements for global equity, which have enabled more vulnerable countries to prosper as well for decades. The world may experience a generation of backsliding, and declining national growth and prosperity amongst vulnerable social groups.

A House of Commons Research note published in March 2025 on the role of the WTO defends the existence of the institution which has promoted multilateral cooperation and agreement over trade since 1948. Since its organisational creation and frameworks, known as GATT and TRIPs Agreements were put in place (GATT48 was replaced by GATT 94 about the time of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994). It has promoted two basic principles on liberalised trade, the most favoured nation (MFN) principles, which allows the privilege of trade with one nation to another by WTO members, where FTAs (free trade agreements) that are the exception to the rules.[23]  Then adaption for trade, Article 20 sought to reform agricultural trade, rules were updated in 2000. The WTO has been lobbied by the US and EU heavily to support more dominant markets, which had been balanced to ensure fairer trade for developing nations.

It has been successful for this reason. Since 1995, there has been a GATT in Service Trade, and Art 5 outlines four modes of supply services through trade.  These frameworks have been vital frameworks for international and multilateral trade regimes over several decades. For example, TRIPs on intellectual property provided a list of areas, including copyright, trade markets, industrial designs, and industrial secrets.

The ‘US has engaged in a trade war with China’, since about 2017, raising disputes at the WTO Appellate Body, but it is now in ‘paralysis’,  despite resolution of complaints by both nations, the US was unable to prove how it was justified to increase tariffs on China for steel and aluminium products, although there are exemptions under national security for any nation. It has since blocked appointments to the Appellate body, which resolves trade disputes. This undermines the role of the WTO and its full functions; it undermines the role of the institution in global trade agreements, and this weakens global trade regimes so that they are more likely to be leveraged for power and geo-politics. This is a greater securities risk for all nations as tensions rise over trade and the impact on national economies grows. This case had an impact on other nations, such as South Korea, the EU, Brazil, and Turkey.[24]  The danger is the rolling back and the advantages and benefits to all nations gained, by societies, leaving the poorest nations most exposed and vulnerable to trade exploitation in the future, without recourse.

Conclusions in March 2025

The global economy is being affected, and first signs are in the markets. The key issue for nations, is the impact on individual nations, their ability to adjust to Tariffs with the least impact on their populations. Wealthy nations may fare better than emerging economies, and it is reasonable to begin to realise that the big picture will illustrate how the global economy is impacted, small changes in one sector in one part of the world such as Canada, can impact smaller economies around the world, such as Australia, New Zealand and Asia Pacific countries. European products will also be affected.  Such as foods, agriculture and tourism as fewer visitors spend money on holidays, which they can no longer afford.

America has offended the sensibilities of the Middle East on a reconstruction plan for Gaza and has ignored events since its proposals for reconstruction of the territory were presented to the public, it now needs to build its reputation through diplomacy in the Middle East, it also needs help from Allies (new and old) in managing Iran.

The impact of the Presidency is also going to be felt domestically, with cuts to State and Federal funding of jobs, those perceived of little value, such as those promoting a ‘woke’ agenda arounds diversity and rights and the role of women and children, but are also more likely to provide some essential services may be at risk – some jobs were axed immediately, but a large proportion of state employees had to be reemployed within a short period of time. The behaviour of government restructuring was of a merger and acquisition, rather than a considered assessment on the impact to public services.  This in addition to expected cuts in US State Funding, or a cap on Medicare and Education, as outlined in a report by the ‘Centre on Budget and Policy Priorities’ in January 2025; indicates that present Presidential proposed cuts in these areas, are likely to raise the cost of US medical care costs to individuals and the State, as Federal Governments examine their budgets closely, as the Centre pushes back on costs of medical care onto Federal Budgets.[25] .

What has been announced are those expected cuts on none-defence spending, such as state education. In March the Whitehouse announced, ‘the closure of the ‘Department of Education’, which can possibly be interpreted as restructuring. It is too early to understand the impact of those policy decisions. Also cost cutting may involve the pushing back of costs to Federal States on disaster recovery and the management of those costs. This may create some disfunction around disaster recovery in environmentally vulnerable federal states, those recovery plans resulting from wildfires and environmental disasters. There are some US local environmental issues and US land management issues which need to be resolved between Agencies.  Cutting costs may impact on the outcomes of those management discussions.

Bibliography

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Clapp, Sebastian and Verhelst, Anne. Members Research Service PE 739.250 – December 2022. A comparative analysis of Article 5 Washington Treaty (NATO) and Article 42(7) TEU  (EU). At a Glance.

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Do We need a new NATO? BBC World Service and RUSI, 20 March 2025.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w3ct5xjs

Europe’s Battle for an Orderly World.

Ep.104 Trump and Putin – the Bromance reignited: with Sir Bill Browder, 4 March 2025.

https://my.rusi.org/events/disorder-podcast-live-europe-s-role-in-the-battle-for-an-orderly-world.html

Ep.105 George Monbiot on Neoliberalism, 11 March 2025.

https://www.rusi.org/podcast-series/disorder-podcast/ep105-george-monbiot-neoliberalism

Ep.106 Europe’s Role In the Battle For an Orderly World – Disorder Live, 13 March 2025

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[1] Lo, Bobo. Going Legit?: The Foreign Policy of Vladimir Putin. Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2018, page 6. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19785. Accessed 19 Mar. 2025.

[2] The Times Radio, Frontline special – military analyst Sean Bell,  World in 10 online. Podcast  March 2025. 14https://shows.acast.com/3b497baf-71cb-4c27-ae5a-f1e801822221/67d467b04fe212e5618161d7

[3] The Times, Online 17 March 2025. “Seoul to accept North Korean troops” https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/ukraine-war-trump-putin-ceasefire-talks-latest-news-38qzd6mmh

[4] Andrew Grene, Defence Correspondent, visiting nuclear sub commander says US will ‘follow through’ on AUKUS, ABC News. 16 March 2025. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-03-17/uss-minnesota-commander-assures-australians-over-aukus-doubts/105058836. Earlier on March 7 2025 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/03/07/nato-in-tatters-britain-security-pact-australia-next/?msockid=32de4dbed6586802044c5fdcd7e369ae

[5] Lo, Bobo. Going Legit?: The Foreign Policy of Vladimir Putin. Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2018, page 6. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19785. Accessed 19 Mar. 2025.

[6] Kellner, Douglas. “Donald Trump as Authoritarian Populist: A Frommian Analysis.” In Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism, edited by Jeremiah Morelock, 9:71–82. University of Westminster Press, 2018. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv9hvtcf.8.

[7] Reuters Putin agrees in Trump call to 30-day ceasefire with Ukraine on energy targets. https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-agrees-trump-proposal-stop-hitting-ukrainian-energy-targets-30-days-2025-03-18/

[8] Reuters 19 March 2025. Kremlin  says Putin and Trump understand and trust each other. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-says-putin-trump-understand-trust-each-other-2025-03-19/

[9] Reuters Zelenskiy calls for blocking Moscow’s attempts to drag out war after Putin-Trump call

By Olena Harmash and Tom Balmforth 19 March 2025.

[10] Two articles “Donald Trump’s Tariffs are a throwback to the 1930s”, And “Economic nationalism” our predecessors wrote “is almost an American invention”. The Economist online 6 March 2025.

[11] The Economist online It is not the economic impact of tariffs that is most worrying. What are the lessons of the 1930s? 6 March 2025 6 March.  And Rosie, Carr. “A slimmed-down market is bad  for everyone”. Investors Chronicle Investment and Education, pp 3. 28 Feruary-6 March 2025.

[12] Elms, Deborah. “Trade Disrupted: Global Tensions, US-China Trade War and COVID-19 Impact.” Southeast Asian Affairs, 2021, pp. 39–52. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27075074. Accessed 11 Mar. 2025.

[13] Ibid page 39-40.

[14] Ibid page 43-44.

[15] United States Trade Representatives online – News announcements https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/news

[16] Deborah Elms page 45.

[17] Lau, Lawrence J. “The Impacts of the Trade War and the COVID-19 Epidemic on China-U.S. Economic Relations.” China Review, vol. 20, no. 4, 2020, pp. 1–38. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26959852. Accessed 11 Mar. 2025.

[18] Deborah Elms page 46.

[19] https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/whats-next-wto

[20] https://www.politico.eu/article/reform-die-usa-washington-world-trade-organization-wto-ngozi-okonjo-iweala-joe-biden/

[21] https://www.ft.com/content/033c362e-ed8b-4ffd-86d9-e51cbd0b9d2c

[22] Lo, Bobo. Going Legit?: The Foreign Policy of Vladimir Putin. Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2018. Page  http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19785.  And Kellner, Douglas. “Donald Trump as Authoritarian Populist: A Frommian Analysis.” In Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism, edited by Jeremiah Morelock, 9:71–82. University of Westminster Press, 2018. Page 71.

[23] House of Commons Library Note, World Trade Organisation Challenges and Opportunities, 25 March 2025, Ana Peres, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9942/CBP-9942.pdf

[24] Page 31.

[25] Tharpe, Wesley, and Meg Wiehe. “President Trump, Congressional Republican Proposals Would Shift Large Costs to States, Inflict Widespread Harm.” Centre on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2025. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep67132, pages1-3.

Research Capacity Ltd. Political Sciences

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[1] Sebastian Clapp and Anne Verhelst, Members Research Service PE 739.250 – December 2022. A comparative analysis of Article 5 Washington Treaty (NATO) and Article 42(7) TEU  (EU). At Glance, European Parliament publication, page 1.

[2] Ibid, page 2.